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
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Cover: Kibi no Makibi and the Chinese Minister Playing Go. Two panels of an *oban* triptych by Kunisada (signing as Toyokuni III), published by Moriya Jihei, 1851-53. Kibi no Makibi was supposed to have brought go to Japan from China (see 'Grand Minister Kibi and the Transmission of Go to Japan' in *Go World* 46). In this print Kibi is shown at the right and the Chinese minister in the center, with the ghost of Abe no Nakamaro, Kibi's deceased friend, behind.

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Go World News

International Go: 1993



Yoda Norimoto

Yoda's Season of Triumph

As we reported in the GW69 news section, 1993 was a marvellous year for Korea, with its players monopolizing the four major international tournaments that were held. Korean players are still doing well, but the player who dominated the international arena at the end of 1993 and in the first part of 1994 was Yoda Norimoto of Japan. Full reports are given below, but a summary of his string of successes will show how well he had been doing:

- winning the 5th TV Asia Championship;
- winning the 8th Super Go Series for Japan by defeating Nie Weiping;
- winning five games in a row in the 2nd Jinro-SBS international tournament;
- reaching the final of the 5th Tong Yang Securities Cup.

The really astonishing thing is that Yoda can do so well internationally, defeating many of the world's top players, and yet he has still to win a major Japanese title — in fact, he hasn't even challenged for one yet.

Incidentally, his personal record against Lee Chang-ho of Korea, who at present holds 12 Korean titles, is 5-1.

Yoda Wins 5th TV Asia Championship

This is a knockout tournament for the finalists in Japan's NHK Cup, China's CCTV Cup, and Korea's KBS Cup. The previous winner is seeded if he doesn't qualify otherwise. Takemiya played in the 1st championship, as that year's winner of the NHK Cup, but though he hasn't made the NHK final since, he is still participating — for the simple reason that he won the first four championships.

In 1993 his amazing winning streak finally came to an end, but the current NHK cup-winner, Yoda Norimoto, then 8-dan, took up the slack. Yoda defeated Lee Chang-ho, Nie Weiping, and Seo Bong-soo — three of the world's top players in anyone's book — to score his first international tournament victory. Full results follow.

First round. Nie Weiping (China) defeated Kato Masao (Japan), Yoda (Japan) d. Lee (Korea), Seo (Korea) d. Ma Xiaochun (China).

Second round. Yoda d. Nie, Seo d. Takemiya.

Final. Yoda d. Seo.

The tournament was held in Beijing in September 1993.

Japan Wins 8th Super Go Series

Japan has finally caught up with China in the Super Go, winning the 8th series and evening the score to date at 4-4. This is a significant victory for Japan, because it was China's successive victories in the first three Super Go series, mainly engineered by its superstar Nie Weiping, that first demonstrated to the go public that China had caught up with Japan.

In the 8th series, a young Japanese 4-dan with no international reputation, Kato Atsushi, shocked the Chinese team by defeating four of its seven members (see GW69 for details).



Yoda's half-point win over Nie secures victory for Japan in the 8th Super Go.

China's fifth player, Chen Linxin 9-dan, finally managed to stop the rout by defeating Kato; he even raised China's hopes by disposing of the next Japanese player, Yuki Satoshi 8-dan, but then Komatsu Hideki 8-dan took over. Komatsu defeated Chen and Ma Xiaochun, before succumbing to Nie Weiping. Yoda Norimoto 9-dan then defeated Nie by half a point to take the series for Japan 7-4.

This was Nie's second half-point loss in a row in the Super Go — the final game in the 7th series went to Awaji by that margin — and apparently he came in for some severe criticism in the Chinese press. The players Japan did not have to field were Yamashiro Hiroshi, Awaji, and Takemiya.

Kobayashi Wins 6th Japan-China Meijin Playoff

For the fifth year in a row, this playoff featured a clash between the same two players: the Japanese Meijin Kobayashi Koichi and the Chinese Meijin Ma Xiaochun. In 1992 Ma made a breakthrough by scoring his first win ever against Kobayashi, then going on to win the playoff.

In the 1993 playoff, it looked as if Ma still had all the momentum when he won the

first game by the same margin — $1\frac{1}{2}$ points — as in his two wins the previous year. However, Kobayashi fought back and took the second game — by $1\frac{1}{2}$ points, of course. That turned the tide and Kobayashi scored a convincing win in the final game by $6\frac{1}{2}$ points. He thus fulfilled the pledge made before leaving Japan: 'I will discharge my responsibility as the Japanese Meijin.' The games were played in Shanghai on 14, 16 and 17 December.

As the match was held in China, it was played according to Chinese rules, but that led to some friction at the end of the second game. Kobayashi had a sure win by $1\frac{1}{2}$ points, with only one *ko* in one of Ma's positions and *dame* points left to play. If playing under Japanese rules, Ma would have connected the *ko*, ending the game, and then the *dame* would have been filled in. Under the Chinese rules, however, there's a possibility of gaining a point by filling in the *dame* first, then winning the *ko* (that is, getting to play an extra *stone* point). Anyway, Kobayashi became annoyed and said: 'Why don't you connect? Stop playing unpleasant moves.' Ma simply responded: 'The rules are different in China.'

Soon Ma connected the *ko*. While filling

in the *dame* after that, Kobayashi, who was still hot under the collar, played successive moves. That's irrelevant under the Japanese rules, but illegal under the Chinese rules, where each stone played counts as a point. However, the referee, Luo Jianwen 7-dan, said nothing, and Kobayashi's win was confirmed. When the Asahi reporter questioned him the next day, Luo said: 'Under the Chinese rules, Kobayashi should have forfeited. But Chinese players [have infringed the Japanese rules when playing in Japan] and not been made to forfeit, so I decided to ignore it.'

That was a wise decision, especially since the *ko* didn't affect the outcome. (Ma also noticed during the game and didn't object; presumably the referee adjusted the count.) Kobayashi has to be criticized for not making allowance for the Chinese rules, but he got upset because the *ko* couldn't change the outcome.

Rui Wins Women's World Championship

The first-ever world championship for women professionals was held in Beijing from 19 to 26 December 1993 with 16 players from four Asian countries competing. The result was no surprise: Rui Naiwei, the world's only woman 9-dan, defeated Yang Hui 8-dan 2-0 in the final.

The tournament was sponsored by a Chinese jewellery company named Cui Bao (which could be translated as 'kingfisher treasure') and was called The Cui Bao Cup: The Women's World Championship. There were supposed to be eight representatives from China, three from Japan, two from Korea, and one each from Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, and Singapore, but as only Singapore fielded a player of these last three, the number of Chinese players was increased to ten.

We do not know how the representatives were selected. At any rate, the Japanese women title holders did not participate. The three Japanese were Aoki Kikuyo 5-dan, Sakakibara Fumiko 5-dan (both former title holders), and Chinen Kaori 1-dan. The only one of these to score a win was Aoki, who was eliminated by Zhang Xuan 7-dan of China in the second round. An interesting

upset in the first round was the defeat of Hua Xueming 7-dan, one of the top Chinese women players, by 16-year-old Yoon 1-dan of Korea. Hua made a splash in the 1994 Fujitsu Cup, as described below.

Yoon lost to Rui in the second round. Only two non-Chinese made the best eight and none made the best four, which only confirms what everyone knows already: the top Chinese women are in a class of their own.

International Go: 1994

Korea Wins 2nd Jinro-SBS, But Yoda Stars

Korea has claimed yet another international victory, with its team winning the rotating knockout tournament The Jinro Cup: The SBS World Championship, for the second year in a row (the third year, if you count the tournament's predecessor — see GW69 for details).

This tournament is a three-way knockout among five-player teams from Japan, China, and Korea. The early star was Seo Bong-soo of Korea, who won four games in a row, but Yoda Norimoto of Japan topped that by winning five in a row. However, he fell two wins short of securing victory for his team, and in the end the Korean prodigy Lee Chang-ho lived up the expectations of Korean fans, defeating the last Japanese player, who was Takemiya.

China had another bad tournament. In the 1st Jinro-SBS, only one Chinese player, Cao Dayuan, had any success, though, at three wins, that was actually the best individual performance. This time the Chinese were not able to win a single game. They are going through their worst slump ever in international go.

Full results:

Yamashiro (Japan) defeated Cao (China).

Seo (Korea) defeated Yamashiro, Yu Bin (China), Ishida Yoshio (Japan), and Liu Xiaoguang (China).

Yoda (Japan) defeated Seo, Ma (China), Chong Soo-hyun 7-dan (Korea), Nie (China), and Yoo 6-dan (Korea).

Cho Hun-hyun (Korea) defeated Yoda

and Komatsu (Japan). (All the above games were played in Beijing from 11 to 17 January 1994.)

Takemiya (Japan) defeated Cho.

Lee Chang-ho (Korea) defeated Takemiya. (These two games were played in Seoul on 22 and 23 February.)

The prize for the winning team is 100 million won (about \$140,000). There is no prize for second or third, though the players do get a fee (about \$2800) for each game.

9th Super Go Starts

The 9th Super Go series has got off to an even start. Yamada Kimio 6-dan, age 21, of Japan defeated former world youth and world amateur champion Chang Hao 5-dan (age 17) of China in the opening game on 23 March 1994, but lost to Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan in the second game, played two days later.

The Chinese are said to be taking this contest very seriously. They have now lost three Super Go series in a row, and they have had a dismal time in international tournaments recently. It was reported that their team held a secret training camp to prepare for the series.

The remaining players on the two teams are:

China: Cao Dayuan 9-dan, Chen Linxin 9-dan, Ma Xiaochun 9-dan, and Nie Weiping 9-dan.

Japan: Komatsu Hideki 8-dan, Yoda Norimoto 9-dan, Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan, Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan, and Kato Masao 9-dan.

5th Tong Yang Securities Cup

Yoda Norimoto 9-dan of Japan will meet Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan of Korea in the best-of-five final of this international tournament. In the semifinals, Yoda defeated the current Fujitsu world champion, Yoo Chang-hyeok 6-dan, 2-0, and Cho defeated Nie Weiping, also by 2-0. The games were played in Seoul on 18 and 20 April.

As always in international tournaments, there were some upsets in the opening rounds. The biggest surprise came in the second round, when Michael Redmond, playing for the U.S.A., defeated the current

Ing world champion, Seo Bong-seo. This is undoubtedly the biggest win of Michael's career so far. Unfortunately, he could not prevail against the 1st Ing champion, Cho Hun-hyun, in the quarterfinals.

Another surprise in the second round, for Korean fans anyway, came when Lee Chang-ho, winner of the 3rd and 4th Cups, was eliminated. However, this was at the hands of Japan's Yoda Norimoto, who has become Lee's nemesis.

Full results are given below.

Round 1 (Seoul, 16 November 1993). Yamashiro (Japan) beat Kim Chul-jung (Korea), Michael Redmond (USA) beat Geert Groenen (Europe), Komatsu (Japan) beat Yang Jaeho (Korea), Kato (Japan) b. Yoon (Korea), Yu Bin (China) beat Lim (Korea), Takemiya (Japan) beat Zheng Hong (China), Yoda (Japan) beat Lin (Chinese Taipei), Liu Xiaoguang (China) beat Kim (Korea).

Round 2 (Seoul, 18 November). Cho Hun-hyun (Korea) beat Yamashiro, Redmond beat Seo Bong-soo (Korea), Yoo Chang-hyeok (Korea) beat Komatsu, Ma Xiaochun (China) beat Kato, Cho Chikun (playing for Korea) beat Yu Bin, Nie Weiping (China) beat Takemiya, Yoda beat Lee Chang-ho (Korea), Rin Kaiho (playing for Chinese Taipei) beat Liu.

Quarterfinals (Seoul, 21 March 1994). Cho Hun-hyun beat Redmond, Nie beat Cho Chikun, Yoo beat Ma, Yoda beat Rin.

Semifinals (Seoul, 18, 20 April). Cho Hun-hyun b. Nie 2-0, Yoda b. Yoo 2-0.

7th Fujitsu Cup

The first two rounds of the 1994 Fujitsu Cup were held at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo on 2 and 4 April, and four Nihon Ki-in players, two from Korea and two from China have made it to the quarterfinals.

The highlight of the first round was the first game ever between Lee Chang-ho (age 18) and Fujisawa Shuko (age 68). The result was a victory for the younger player, who had sat out this tournament last year.

In the second round, the big guns appeared — the top three place-getters from the previous cup are seeded individually and five others are seeded by country — and there were some very interesting clashes.

The most exciting game was perhaps the one between Kato Masao and Lee: it was full of dramatic trades and the lead switched back and forth. Kato ended up ahead at the end, so once again Lee has failed in the Fujitsu Cup. His results in overseas games certainly don't reflect his stature as Korea's number one.

The big upset of the second round was another win over a top player by a Chinese woman. Last year it was Yang Hui who made news by beating Takemiya; this time it was a player not yet well known outside China, Hua Xueming 7-dan, who provided the fireworks by beating Otake Hideo.

Hua joins her compatriot Zhang Wendong in the quarterfinals. These are not the Chinese representatives one might have expected to see there, but the top Chinese once again had a bad tournament. Liu Xiaoguang was beaten by Chen of Chinese Taipei in the first round and Ma Xiaochun lost to Seo Bong-soo of Korea. Nie Weiping did not play this time.

Results to date:

Round 1 (2 April). Michael Redmond (North America) defeated Fernando Aguilar (South America), Yamashiro (Japan) d. Lin (Chinese Taipei), Yu Bin (China) d. Choi (Korea), Chen (Chinese Taipei) d. Liu (China), Seo (Korea) d. Ma (China), Hua (China) d. Rob van Zeijst (Europe), Lee (Korea) d. Fujisawa Shuko (Japan), Ishida Yoshio (Japan) d. Yang Jaeho (Korea).

Round 2 (4 April). Kobayashi Koichi (Japan) d. Redmond, Yoo (Korea) d. Yamashiro, Cho Chikun (Japan) d. Yu, Zhang (China) d. Chen, Rin Kaiho (Japan) d. Seo, Hua d. Otake (Japan), Kato (Japan) d. Lee, Cho Hun-hyun (Korea) d. Ishida.

Quarterfinal pairings (to be played in June). Kobayashi v. Yoo, Cho Chikun v. Zhang, Rin v. Hua, Kato v. Cho Hun-hyun.

News from Japan: 1993

Meijin Title: Kobayashi Makes It Six in a Row

After a very tense match the previous year, the 18th Meijin title match, between the same players, was surprisingly one-sided, with Kobayashi comfortably rebuffing

Otake's third challenge in four years 4-1. That gave Kobayashi his sixth Meijin title in a row, which is a new record. Very few players have qualified for an honorary title, the condition for which is winning five years in a row, which makes Kobayashi's triple run — eight years in the Kisei, six years each in the Meijin and Gosei — all the more extraordinary.

Otake has now played in 12 Meijin title matches (Rin has played in 14, including every year from 1965 to 1974), but he has only been successful four times.

The results:

Game 1 (1, 2 Sept.). Kobayashi (W) by 1½.
Game 2 (15, 16 Sept.). Kobayashi (B) by 1½.
Game 3 (29, 30 Sept.). Otake (B) by 6½.
Game 4 (6, 7 Oct.). Kobayashi (B) by resig.
Game 5 (20, 21 Oct.). Kobayashi (W) by resig.

Kato Regains Oza Title

Kato had already won the Oza title ten times, a record total for all titles, but he was still not satisfied. In the 48th title match, he defeated Fujisawa Shuko 3-0 and extended his tally to 11. The match was not as one-sided as the score might seem to indicate. Shuko actually played quite well, but he made blunders at crucial stages in each game. At 68, his stamina may have let him down.

This was the first title match between these two since 1978, when Shuko beat Kato 4-3 in the Kisei and Kato prevailed 3-1 in the Tengen. Incidentally, in the playoff to decide the challenger (held on 16 September), Kato defeated Yoda, so the latter's title match debut (in Japan) is still to come.

The results:

Game 1 (14 Oct.). Kato (W) by resig.
Game 2 (21 Oct.). Kato (B) by resig.
Game 3 (3 Nov.). Kato (W) by resig.

Rin Defends Tengen to Earn Honorary Title

Yet another honorary title was at stake in the 19th Tengen title match, and Rin Kaiho made no mistake, defeating the challenger, Kataoka Satoshi, 3-1 to secure his fifth Tengen title in a row. Rin was in terrible form last year and had a losing streak of nine games in a row which was finally broken



Kato and family at the Oza award ceremony

just before this title match began, but he rose to the occasion and displayed the redoubtable fighting skills that have now kept him at the top for nearly 30 years. His victory made him the first Honorary Tengen (the title is not actually assumed until he turns 60 or retires).

In the playoff to decide the challenger, held on 14 October, Kataoka ended the remarkable winning run in this title of the 21-year-old Yamada Kimio 5-dan, who has recently established himself as one of the new stars on the Japanese go scene.

The results:

- Game 1 (11 Nov.). Rin (W) by 1½.
- Game 2 (25 Nov.). Kataoka (W) by resig.
- Game 3 (2 Dec.). Rin (W) by 1½.
- Game 4 (16 Dec.). Rin (B) by resig.

Honorary Title Holders

Kisei: Fujisawa Shuko, Kobayashi Koichi
Meijin: Cho Chikun, Kobayashi Koichi
Honinbo: Takagawa, Sakata, Ishida Yoshio,
Cho Chikun
Tengen: Rin Kaiho
Oza: Kato Masao
Gosei: Otake Hideo, Kobayashi Koichi

News from Japan: 1994

Cho Chikun's Comeback as Kisei

Kobayashi Koichi's eight-year reign as the number one player in Japan has finally come to an end, and the player who dethroned him is the player from whom he took the title in 1986. Kobayashi thus lost his chance of matching Takagawa's record of nine titles in a row.

Every year since taking the title Kobayashi had been expecting him to become the challenger (in the Meijin title as well), but somehow Cho had always missed out, even though he made the final playoff three times. Once he did win the right to challenge, the odds favoured him. Not only had he won three best-of-sevens in a row against Kobayashi recently (the 1990 to 1992 Honinbo title matches), he also had the enviable record of never having lost a challenge for a best-of-seven. This year's Kisei was his fifth and he maintained his clean slate.

Kobayashi made a good start, with a convincing win in the first game, but Cho bounced back to win the next three games.

That put Kobayashi in the position Cho was always in in their Honinbo clashes, but although Kobayashi vowed that he would 'do it Cho-style', he was able to save only one *kadoban*.

Cho's win in the sixth game gave him his fourth Kisei title and his 16th big title (that is, best-of-seven). It was also the 92nd game between Cho and Kobayashi and it evened their career record at 46 wins each.

The results:

Game 1 (Shanghai, 12, 13 Jan.). Kobayashi (B) by resig.

Game 2 (26, 27 Jan.). Cho (B) by 6½.

Game 3 (2, 3 Feb.). Cho (W) by 3½.

Game 4 (16, 17 Feb.). Cho (B) by resig.

Game 5 (23, 24 Feb.). Kobayashi (B) by 3½.

Game 6 (9, 10 March). Cho (B) by 6½.

32nd Judan: Otake Rebuffs Kobayashi's Challenge

In his sixth attempt, Otake Hideo scored his first-ever success against Kobayashi Koichi in a title match when he rebuffed the latter's challenge for the 32nd Judan title 3–2. Otake had taken a 2–1 lead, but Kobayashi came back with a half-point win in the fourth game. Otake turned on the power in the decider and won a large *semeai*. After his past reverses, this must have made a nice change for him. Like Rin Kaiho, who is the same age (they both turned 52 in May 1994), he is successfully holding on to his place at the top. Since April last year, he has won two Judan titles and the Fujitsu Cup and taken second place in the Ing Cup.

Kobayashi Koichi became the challenger by first winning the winners' section, then defeating Rin Kaiho in the playoff with the winner of the losers' section.

The results:

Game 1 (3 March). Kobayashi (W) by resig.

Game 2 (24 March). Otake (W) by 7½.

Game 3 (7 April). Otake (B) by 1½.

Game 4 (21 April). Kobayashi (B) by ½.

Game 5 (27 April). Otake (W) by resig.

Kataoka to Challenge Cho Honinbo

Kataoka has twice won the Tengen title, and now, thanks to his 6–1 score in the 49th Honinbo league, he will be making his debut in two-day games. Yamashiro Hiroshi lost

his chance to force a playoff when he lost his final-round game to Rin Kaiho by half a point.

This league was dominated by Kataoka, Yamashiro, and Komatsu, while former Honinbos Takemiya and Rin did badly. In retrospect, the key game was the encounter between Yamashiro and Kataoka, won by the latter, on 27 December 1993. Komatsu had led at the halfway mark but faded thereafter. His game with Rin in the first round produced a *chosei* (eternal life — see GW64, page 63 for an explanation) — the second known example in professional play, so the game was declared 'no result'. There is no provision for a replay, so Rin and Komatsu each got half a point.

19th Meijin League

The new members of the 19th league are Awaji Shuzo, Kataoka Satoshi, and Sato Masaharu. Awaji and Kataoka dropped out of the 18th league (see chart in GW69), but promptly climbed back in. Sato (born 1947) was making his second appearance in the league after a gap of 13 years. That's a remarkable performance, because in spring last year Sato underwent an operation to remove a brain tumour. At the time, he said, 'I was afraid I'd never be able to play go again.'

Sato's target was to improve on his 3–5 result in the 6th league, but, as our chart shows, that's already impossible. That's nothing to be ashamed of, for this is one of the strongest leagues for a long time. The early leader, with four straight wins, was Kataoka, but on 5 May he suffered a half-point loss at the hands of Cho Chikun, so Kato has a chance of catching up with him. That loss also revived the hopes of the two-loss group. Yoda's lacklustre performance is a surprising contrast — perhaps he saves his energy for international games.

Women's Titles

15th Women's Kakusei

Kobayashi Chizu 5-dan defeated Yoshida Mika 6-dan in the final, played in Düsseldorf on 10 September 1993, to win her second Kakusei tournament. Kobayashi also won in

49th Honinbo League (1994) *Title-holder: Cho Chikun*

Rank	Name	Y	K	R	K	F	T	O	Y	Score	Place
1	Yamashiro	—	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	5-2	2
2	Komatsu	0	—	½	1	1	1	0	0	3½	4
3	Rin Kaiho	1	½	—	0	0	1	0	0	2½	—
4	Kataoka	1	0	1	—	1	1	1	1	6-1	1
5	Fujisawa	0	0	1	0	—	0	0	1	2-5	—
5	Takemiya	0	0	0	0	1	—	1	0	2-5	—
5	O Rissei	0	1	1	0	1	0	—	1	4-3	3
5	Yuki	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	—	3-4	—

Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

19th Meijin League (as of 5 May 1994) *Title-holder: Kobayashi Koichi*

Rank	Name	O	C	T	Y	R	K	S	A	K	Score
1	Otake	—		0	1			1		0	2-2
2	Cho Chikun		—		1	0	1	1	0	1	4-2
3	Takemiya	1		—	1	1			0	0	3-2
4	Yoda	0	0	0	—	1	0				1-4
5	Rin Kaiho		1	0	0	—		1	1		3-2
6	Kato		0		1		—	1	1		3-1
7	Sato	0	0			0	0	—		0	0-5
7	Awaji		1	1		0	0		—	0	3-2
7	Kataoka	1	0	0				1	1	—	4-1

Note: The players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.



Yoshida Mika

1989. Yoshida Mika also came second the previous year. She had a reputation of being weak under pressure, but . . .

Yoshida Wins Women's Honinbo

Yoshida Mika quickly recovered from her setback in the Women's Kakusei by winning a more important tournament. On 6 December she won the third game of the 12th Women's Honinbo title match to take the title from Kato Tomoko with a 2-1 score. Yoshida thus became the second woman player from the Kansai Ki-in to win a title. She was spurred on by her father, who shouted at her, after she lost the first game of the match, that she should take her diploma back to the Kansai Ki-in and exchange it for a 2-dan one. Her older brother is also a 6-dan professional.

6th Women's Meijin

Sugiuchi Kazuko 8-dan won this title for the fourth year in a row when she defeated Ogawa Tomoko 5-dan 2-1. The deciding game was played on 16 February 1994.

In 1993 Ogawa made a comeback to full-time go playing after devoting herself to child rearing for a number of years.

Haya-go Titles

Otake Wins NHK Cup

Otake Hideo won the 41st NHK Cup, defeating Kato Masao in the final. This was Otake's fifth NHK cup, but his first for 14 years.

Kataoka Wins Haya-go Championship

Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan defeated Cho Chikun in the final of the 26th Haya-go Championship. This is the first time Kataoka has won this title.

Kobayashi Wins Kakusei

Soon after losing the Kisei title to Cho, Kobayashi Koichi took a small measure of revenge by defeating Cho in the final of the 16th Kakusei tournament, played on 31 March.

Komatsu Wins NEC Cup

Komatsu Hideki 8-dan defeated Cho Chikun by half a point in the final of the 13th NEC Cup to score his first victory in a tournament not restricted to junior players. Komatsu has been one of the top group in Japan for some years now, so this success is long overdue. He overcame some other notable players to get to the final: Takemiya Masaki in the first round and Kobayashi Koichi in the semifinal.

The NEC Cup is a *haya-go* tournament with an impressive first prize of ¥10,000,000. The 13th cup started in April 1993, with the top 13 players competing, and concluded on 19 March 1994.

Recent Promotions

The following players were among those earning promotions in the 1993 autumn *oteai*.

To 9-dan: Yoda Norimoto, Tei Meiko,

Ogata Masaki

To 3-dan: Kato Tomoko

News from Korea

Lee Chang-ho Close to a Monopoly

On 28 March, Lee Chang-ho 6-dan defeated his teacher Cho Hun-hyun to take the 33rd Top Position title with a 3-0 score. That gave Lee his 12th concurrent title and extended his personal record. Cho is left with three titles and Yoo Chang-hyeok with one.

Lee's swag includes the Tongyang Cup, from which he has already been eliminated this year, but no one in Korea, where the 18-year-old has been a national hero ever since he started winning titles four years ago, doubts that it will take him long to fill the gap.

Actually, March was not the first time Lee took his total to 12 titles. There was a headline in *Go Weekly* to the same effect last December when he took Seo's only internal title away from him.

At the end of 1993, a Korean newspaper carried out a survey among university students asking them who they expected to be in the news in 1994. Taking 8th place, amid all the political figures, was Lee Chang-ho. The newspapers also speculate that it is just a matter of time before Lee makes a clean sweep of all the titles.

Note. We spell Lee's name the way it is spelt on his entry form for the Fujitsu Cup, but actually his surname is pronounced 'ee' [i:] as in 'meet'. The character 李 that is his surname (an extremely common name in Korea) is variously transcribed as Lee, Yi, and I. The spelling of his given name can be taken at face value.

News from China

Ma Monopolizes Title Matches

On 24 February 1994, Ma Xiaochun scored his third successive win to no losses in the 8th Tianyuan title match and took the title from Liu Xiaoguang. This triumph gives Ma a clean sweep of all the Chinese titles decided by title matches, that is, the

Mingren, Tianyuan, Qiwang (king of go), and Da Guo Shou (national championship).

Since August last year, Ma has been invincible in Chinese titles. First he beat Cao Dayuan 3-0 in the 6th Mingren title, earning the title of Honorary Mingren; at the end of October, he beat Qian Yuping 2-0 in the new Da Guo Shou title; at the end of the year he beat Cao 3-0 in the Qiwang title. Winning four titles without dropping one game is impressive.

There are three other titles. Ma took second place in both the Ten Strongest Players tournament and the CCTV *haya-go* tournament. Neither he nor Nie has played in the individual national championship for a number of years now. As a Chinese newspaper put it, 'Nie and Ma have been rivals for ten years, and now it's the age of Ma.'

Ma's own comment: 'If I don't win an international tournament, being a quadruple title-holder will mean nothing in the eyes of go fans. This year I'm going to do my best to take an international title.'

Just for the record, the Ten Strongest Players and the CCTV were both won by Nie. The individual championship was won by Zhang Wendong.

Obituaries

Fujita Goro (1902-94)

Fujita Goro, the doyen of go in Kyoto, died on 24 January this year. He was posthumously awarded an 8-dan diploma.

Fujita was born in Toyohashi City in Aichi Prefecture. As a student at Kyoto University, he became a disciple of Yoshida Misako, a leading woman go player, and after her death he took over the 'Yoshida School'. Fujita played an important role in popularizing go in Japan, especially among university students and women. After the war, he created a national organization for university go. His many professional disciples included Rin Kaiho, who lived in Kyoto until he was 6-dan, and Sakaguchi Ryuzo 9-dan.

Yasunaga Hajime (1901-94)

Yasunaga Hajime, a prominent figure in the go world since the 1930s, died of pneumonia on 2 February 1994. Yasunaga studied science at Tohoku University but gave up before graduating and entered the go world. As the nephew of Hirotaki Zekken, a top go journalist who was Shusai's ghost writer, he was treated like a Shusai disciple. In 1932 he joined the Nihon Ki-in as editor of *Kido*, and the following year he co-authored a best-selling book, *The New Fuseki Method*, with Go Seigen and Kitani Minoru. He left the Nihon Ki-in after just one year and founded his own go club at Shimbashi and his own go magazine, *Igo Shunju* (Go Spring and Autumn). The magazine lasted from 1937 to 1974. In 1962 he founded the All-Japan Amateur Go Federation and worked to improve the organization of amateur go. He created the 'Chinese-style' fuseki at an amateur study group he founded; it got its name because it became popular in China when he introduced it there on a tour he made in 1963. Chinese players later 're-imported' it back into Japan. Yasunaga is also responsible for many innovations in josekis and he was also known for his pungent criticisms of title games, published in his magazine.



In 1980 Yasunaga took third place in the 2nd World Amateur Go Championship. He has written extensively on go history and made a large contribution to promoting go exchange between Japan and China.

Miwa Yoshiro (1921-94)

Miwa Yoshiro 8-dan died on 13 February 1994. A disciple of Hashimoto Uтарo, he became 1-dan in 1938 and reached 8-dan in 1982. He served as a Nihon Ki-in director for 11 years. He was the game recorder for the 'atom bomb' game.

2nd Ing Cup Final Otake v. Seo



Seo receives the Championship Cup from Ing Chang-Ki.

The final of the 2nd Ing Cup: The World Professional Go Championship featured a clash between two of the world's top players: Otake Hideo of Japan, the Fujitsu World Champion, and Seo Bong-soo of Korea, who in 1992 was selected by his compatriots as the most outstanding player of the year. The first two games of the best-of-five playoff were held on the Korean resort island of Cheju in March and the remaining three in Singapore in May. In a very closely fought match, the honours went to Seo Bong-soo, who will therefore reign until 1997 as the Ing World Champion. He was also rewarded with the top prize in the go world: \$400,000.

This win marks a new peak in the career of Seo Bong-soo. Although he has won his fair share of titles in Korea, for most of his career he has been in the shadow of the phenomenal Cho Hun-hyun, who dominated Korean go in the 80s. In the 90s, a new star, Lee Chang-ho, has arisen who threatens to eclipse both of them, but Seo has demon-

strated with this victory that he is far from ready to be pushed offstage. Seo has always been very popular with Korean fans, because he was the strongest player of his generation (he was born on 1 February 1953) who did not go to Japan to study (Cho Hun-hyun's popularity was always clouded by his decade in Japan, where he stayed until he was 5-dan). The main factor in Seo's being chosen as the player of the year last year was his victory over Cho Chikun, a Korean player who has chosen to live in Japan permanently, in the semifinal of the Ing Cup.

Perhaps because Seo is not as well known in Japan as Cho Hun-hyun and Lee, the Japanese confidently expected Otake to win the final and become the first joint Ing-Fujitsu world champion. They were perhaps not fully aware of Seo's reputation in Korea as a tenacious, never-say-die player. The Korean public was quite confident that Seo would be the victor.



Otake and Seo shake hands before the match starts.

Game One

White: Otake Hideo 9-dan (Japan)
Black: Seo Bong-soo 9-dan (Korea)
 Played on Cheju Island, Korea, on 9 March 1993. Komi: 8 points. Time: 3½ hours each.
 Commentary by Kudo Norio 9-dan. Report by Akiyama Kenji.

white: he believes that the large *komi* is a burden on Black.

Black 31 may have been dubious. Otake: 'When I made the two one-space jumps at 34 and 36, I thought I'd be unlikely to lose.' How should Black have played then? Kudo (who acted as referee for the match): 'If I were Black, I'd follow *Dia. 1*.'





Figure 1 (1-47)

Figure 1 (1-47). Otake confident
 Otake won the *nigiri* and elected to take



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Black lets White surround the bottom area up to 6, then presses down on White with 7. If White tries to meddle with the black *moyo* on the right, there is a strong

possibility that Black will be able to turn the left side into territory while dispensing with an enclosing move at 'a'. There is no guarantee that White will play as in this diagram, but still it looks like a good strategy for Black.

Perhaps because of the pressure of appearing in his first international final, Seo plays more quietly than is his usual style. Black 39 is a little submissive; countering with 39 at A, followed by White B and Black C, looks more interesting.

White 40 is an excellent point. Black has to come in at 47.




Figure 2 (48-69)


Figure 2 (48-69). Differences of opinion

White 48. Kudo: 'This *atari* is typical of Otake. It wouldn't occur to an ordinary professional to play it. Using 48 to extend at A would lead to a tough fight after Black pushed down at 49, so you can say that 48 is natural. Still . . .'


Playing a single forcing move at 50 stirred debate in the pressroom. Why doesn't White counter 51 by cutting at 1 in *Dia. 2*? Capturing with 2 looks best for Black, so White can force with 3. That sets up a good move at 'a' for later.

One's first instinct is certainly to follow *Dia. 2*, but Kudo speculated that Otake may have noticed a nasty counter.

Dia. 3. Black might answer 1 by hemming White in with 2 and 4. If White 5, Black plays 6 and 8, and White can't avoid an *oiotoshi* after 16 (that is to say, he could avoid it by capturing 16 next, but permitting Black to *atari* on the left side of 11 is bad). If White plays 5 at 8, the *ko* after Black 'a', White 7, Black 'b' is a nuisance: White is forced to fight where he doesn't want to.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

That's why Otake switches to 52. This move was not very well received in the pressroom either, where it was thought that pressing at 69 would have been superior. The international array of faces there was impressive: Go Seigen, Rui Naiwei, Lee Chang-ho . . . However, Otake dismissed their suggestion: 'I couldn't play like that in a million years.' White 52 was the only move that suggested itself to him. Presumably he was ready for the fight that followed Black's uncompromising answer with 53 and 55.

A large *ko* fight seems unavoidable after Black 69.





Figure 3 (70-87)
78: ko



Dia. 4

Figure 3 (70-87). *Failing to keep things simple*

White plays 70 and 72 to create a large ko threat, then starts the ko with 74. He can't afford to answer 79, so a trade follows. The evaluation of the result saw yet another divergence of opinion. The group in the press-room believed that Black had had the better of it, but Otake rejoined: 'Making a capture like 80 is too good. The game is over. They should study the game more seriously.'

Kudo: 'Winning the ko certainly looks good for White. So, instead of 73, descending at 1 in Dia. 4 looks superior. When White plays 2 and 4, Black ends the ko with 5 and 7.

This result would be close to even, I think. Since Otake is so fond of thickness, he might be upset to end up with such a thin position.'

The conviction that the game was virtually decided perhaps led Otake to make an overplay. White 84 was terrible.

Otake: 'I knew that pressing at A would have been more clearcut. But I gave in to the temptation to play 84. My usual frivolity. Please don't criticize me too much.'

For the spectators, complications are preferable to seeing the game simplified. At any rate, White 84 gave Seo a chance to show his true worth. Answering passively will lose. Black 85 and 87 demonstrate Seo's strength in adversity.




Figure 4 (88-110)

Figure 4 (88-110). *Mixing it up*

Korean players have a reputation for being strong at infighting, Seo in particular. The reason why Cho Chikun had such a hard time in the semifinal was because Seo's punches came from where you least expected them. You might think, therefore, that Otake would have been better advised to avoid infighting, relying instead on his lucid whole-board judgement, but in this game he fought to the maximum.


The moves from 88 to 96 are pretty well inevitable. If White uses 90 to extend at A, the capturing race will be bad for him after Black 94. If White fills in black liberties with 90 and 92, then he can answer Black 94 with

White B. If instead Black plays at C, White can safely answer with D, Black E, White B.

Black 95. If Black jumps to F instead, then after White G and Black 97 he can capture the white stones to the right but on too small a scale.

If Black can secure the capture with 95 and 97, he will be able to stage an upset. However, it seems that Otake had read out how to rescue his stones. First he forces with 98, then goes into action with 106.

Black 105. If Black plays at 1 in *Dia. 5*, White takes profit with 2 and 4, on top of which there's still some *aji* on the right. White could also play 2 at 3, followed by Black 'a' and White 'b'.



Dia. 5

Dia. 6

Black 107. If Black tries to seal White in by brute force with 1 in *Dia. 6*, White cuts with 4 and 6, then builds a wall. The black group at the bottom is now endangered.

Figure 5 (111–170). *Otake wraps the game up.*

Black 11. If instead Black extends at 45, White gets a ladder with White 14–Black 16–White A — please confirm this for yourself. Black 11 forestalls this ladder, but now White can play the *tesuji* of 12 and 14. When he rescues his group in comfort up to 14, the outlook for him is good.

Black 35. Kudo: 'This is strange when the game is bad for Black. Playing more aggressively at B is probably the only move. The black group at the bottom would not be alive, but Otake would not try to capture it.

That would make the game closer.'

Black's hopes are completely extinguished when White plays the two-fold forcing combination of 38 and 44. Otake starts 'driving safely' with 46.

Black 63 perhaps shows that Seo has lost the will to fight on. If 63 is omitted, a *ko* follows with White 63, Black C, White D, Black E, but since the game is lost anyway, Black should invite White to fight the *ko*.




Figure 5 (111–170)




Figure 6 (171–264)

120: connects (right of 74);

130: connects (above 80);

151: *ko* (at 147); 161: connects (at 148)

Figure 6 (171–264). The burden of the komi

There's nothing to comment on in this figure. Black is one point ahead on the board, so he loses by $6\frac{1}{2}$ points, by Japanese counting.

'Giving $7\frac{1}{2}$ points komi is not easy,' Otake commented after the game. If so, what strategy does he intend to adopt in the second game?

'Play boldly and mix it up. Be reckless.'

White wins by 7 points.

(Igo Club, May 1993)

Game Two

White: Seo Bong-soo

Black: Otake Hideo

Played on Cheju Island on 11 March 1993.

Commentary by Kudo Norio 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1–31)



Dia. 1

Figure 1 (1–31). A perfect capping move

Black 17. Black could also consider capping at 1 in *Dia. 1*. Black 1 to 5 would lead to a completely different game.

Black settles himself solidly with 17 and 19, then springs into action with 27. This is a superb point — the only move.




Figure 2 (32–62)

Figure 2 (32–62). Mixing it up

Black 55 is aggressive; as Otake commented later, jumping to 62 instead would have been more peaceful. Black 55 makes the game hectic.

White 58 is an overplay: White A would be more solid. In this case, the players and the spectators in the pressroom were in agreement.



Otake





Figure 3 (63-100)
45: ko



Dia. 2

Figure 3 (63-100). Otake's oversight

The result to 77 is quite satisfactory for Black: capturing the four white stones gives him a promising game.

Up to this point, both players had been playing very fast. One of the rules of the Ing Cup is that instead of *byo-yomi* players who run out of time have to take 35-minute time extensions at a cost of two points *komi*, with a maximum of three extensions (after that you lose on time). This rule is irrelevant to these two players, especially Otake, who was playing at lightning speed.

Seo's pace was not much slower than

Otake's, but he took his time over 78 and 80, presumably because he was worried about his position. Otake also had to be careful, because his top centre group lacked eye space.

Black 87 was perhaps the losing move. Apparently Otake overlooked the 98-100 combination. Instead of 87, Black should press at 1 in *Dia. 2*; if White descends at 2, Black can next launch a strong attack in the centre with 3 and 5. A very difficult fight would follow, but Black had no choice but to play like this.

Losing the top after adding stones at 89 and 99 is terrible.




Figure 4 (101-150)
45: ko

Figure 4 (101-150)

Black does his best to attack the centre white group, but it has no trouble living.

Figure 5 (151-200)

Figure 6 (201-281)

With Seo's win (the winning margin would be 4½ points by the Japanese count), the match became a best-of-three. The players had two months to rest before the contest was resumed in Singapore.

White wins by 5 points.

(Go Weekly, 30 March 1993)

Game Three

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Seo Bong-soo

Played in Singapore on 16 May 1993.




Figure 5 (151-200)

ko: 75, 78, 81, 84, 87, 90

91: throw-in (diagonally above 86)

92: captures; 93: ko; 95: connects (at 72)




Figure 6 (201-258)

30: ko (at 26); 49: connects (below 5);

57: connects (at 42).

The dame moves from 259 to 281 are omitted.
At the end each side connects a ko.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). *Not up to standard?*

This commentary is based on comments made by Go Seigen and Rui Naiwei in the pressroom during the game.

Black 21. Once having invaded at 19, fighting with a *hane* at 26 is the only move. Dodging to 21 is wrong. Go Seigen had an acid comment: 'The players these days understand the part but not the whole.'

Defending with 22 gives White a satisfactory position, according to Go.

Next, Otake came in for the sharp side of Go Seigen's tongue. White 32 looked like an Otake-style thick move, but Go wanted to see White continue the attack by pulling back at 36.

Black 37 helps the opponent; he should simply defend at 39. At this stage, in Go Seigen's opinion, the game is hardly of a standard befitting a world championship.

White 40 is terrible. Attacking at the vital point of A is the only move — that would give White the lead.

Pressing at 41 is a good move: the game is even again.

White 50 is too peaceful. White should reduce at B before Black plays 51 in Figure 2.

Figure 2 (51–100). *Seo takes control.*

Capping at 53 works well for Black. White's centre line of communication is broken, and the game suddenly becomes difficult for him. Hereafter, he is forced completely on the defensive.




Figure 2 (51–100)

Game Four

White: Seo Bong-soo

Black: Otake Hideo

Played in Singapore on 18 May 1993.

Commentary by Go Seigen.




Figure 1 (1–50)

Figure 1 (1–50). *Black's good start*

White 20 should be the other contact play, that is, at A.

Black 23. Better to play at 24, then after White B push through at C — that would be the quickest path to victory.

Even so, the breadth of Black's position on the right side makes this a satisfactory start for him, which is why 20 should have been at A.

White 38 is an excellent move, and White D, instead of 40, would be an excellent follow-up. If White is going to make an approach move, then a large knight's move (left of 41) might be superior to 40.




Figure 3 (101–119)

Figure 3 (100–119). *A one-sided game*

This game was the first win by Black in the title match.

White resigns after Black 119.

(Kido, July 1993)






Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). *The game is decided.*

Poking his head out with 51 to 59 makes this an easy game for Black. He also does well in the exchange to 71 on the left.

White decides to settle the right side with 72 to 78. Black has been worried about his *aji* here, so White's strategy is a little surprising. If he were confident he was ahead, that would be different, but . . .

White 80 is the losing move; that is to say, it's too quiet. Of course, White is worried about the *aji* of A, but —

Go: 'The position is not such that White can afford to [fix up his *aji*]. He has to stake the game on invading at 88. That's the only move.'

Up to 87, Black solidifies his left-side territory, then up to 95 he strengthens his top group. There is now no room for complications.

'It's over,' said Go, and he got up and left the room. There are thus no comments on the rest of the game, but there seems no need. Black has no trouble wrapping up the game.

This game also was played at a surprising speed. It's understandable that the player in the lead, Otake, should play fast, but a little surprising that Seo should match him.




Figure 3 (101-150)




Figure 4 (151-200)

65: ko (right of 62); 69: connects (below 63)
ko (over 83): 91, 94, 97, 100

Figure 3 (101-150)

Figure 4 (151-200)

Figure 5 (201-284)

Black wins by 9 points.

(Go Weekly, 1 June 1993)




Figure 5 (201-284)

ko: 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 42
ko (over 60): 63, 66, 69, 72; 73: throw-in (at 67)
74: takes (at 13); 75: ko; 77: connects (at 55)
80: connects (at 19)

Game Five

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Seo Bong-soo

Played in Singapore on 20 May 1993.

Commentary by Otake Hideo.




Figure 1 (1-28)

Figure 1 (1-28). Conscious of the komi

Playing tenuki after the single approach move of 5, then tenuki again after 15 is a special strategy. White has no cause whatsoever for dissatisfaction with the result to 22, however.

Because this was the fifth game, we carried out the *nigiri* again. By the Ing rules, the person who guesses right in the *nigiri* can choose either white or black. I won and chose white. After all, with a large *komi* of 7½ points . . .

However, I later heard from Mr. Ing that even with the large *komi* Black's winning rate is 51%. There's the problem of the sample, and of the different strategies adopted by Black and White, so this figure is not enough in itself for one to say anything about the *komi*, but even so . . . 'Why didn't you tell me sooner?' I reproached Mr. Ing. This was in jest. Even if I had heard earlier, I would probably still have chosen white. As a Japanese professional and from fighting spirit also, one must take white.

It may be a difference of just two points, but that's a big difference for Black. Psychologically, it's a heavy burden. White, on the other hand, can play leisurely. That's why most players have chosen white so far.


Out of concern for the large *komi*, Seo adopted a strategy of developing rapidly. He left the bottom left corner and hurried ahead with 17, 21, and 23. Because of the burden of the *komi*, he probably wanted to set up a *moyo* early and settle the issue there. Give himself a chance to show his power. However, letting White play as he pleases up to 22 may actually have simplified the game. White has no worries anywhere; when I invaded at 24, I felt that this was a comfortable development for me.

There is, after all, a problem in Black's play on the left side. It's not easy to say what he should have done, but I think he should have played with more ingenuity, for example, with Black 9 at A or Black 17 at B. After 22, Black has no *aji* or anything on the left side.


In the game I entered at 24, but various strategies are conceivable here. One is also tempted to play at 1 in *Dia. 1* (next page) or at 'a' or 'b'. White 1 is the most peaceful strat-

egy. White holds back, making good shape at the bottom while aiming at 'c'. There would be no danger of White's falling behind even without a large *komi*. White 1 is a perfectly reasonable strategy.

Black 25 is a choice fraught with risk, but if Black just plays 1 in *Dia. 2* he can't hope to make an effective attack on White, so he will fall behind in territory. The decision to take a chance was perhaps forced on Seo.



Dia. 1: more peaceful



Dia. 2: too slow for Black

Figure 2 (29–67). The appeal of Seo's go

Black was forced to play aggressively in the top right corner because of his fuseki failure. Impatience breeds impatience, and gradually the game begins to tilt White's way.

There's an indescribable power in Seo's go. If you wanted to say it's unpolished, you

wouldn't be wrong. It's tenacious and sturdy. It's overflowing with a weed-like wildness. I don't mean that in a bad sense — I'm referring to his strength.

When you mention Korean go in Japan, we immediately think of Cho Hun-hyun and Lee Chang-ho. For better or for worse, Cho, who studied in Japan, and his disciple Lee play a Japanese style of go. They are sagacious and agile. Seo's go is the polar opposite. He has his own unique style that he has built up himself, and that's what makes him so interesting.




Figure 2 (29–67)


Black 29 and 31 and also 33 are moves Seo planned when he attached at 25 in Figure 1. There are times when this kind of play can be effective. However, in this game, in which White has no worries elsewhere, Black can't expect very much from his attack when White moves out into the centre with 44. Anyone can see that Black's attack has not gained him very much. His strategy has clearly been a failure.

To look at the problems on my side, I should have used 40 to *atari* at A. At this stage, Black will probably connect at B, so White can then jump out at 40.

Exchanging A for B would take away Black's eye shape. The way the game develops later, White can't expect Black to answer A by connecting. Instead of being stingy, I should have forced with A.

Black 47 and 49 are painful moves to play, as they help solidify White, but if Black doesn't watch out White may aim at C. Black is not playing 47 and 49 willingly but because he has no choice.

Is invading at 66 the right move? During the game and even now I still have doubts. I also considered playing 1 and 3 or simply playing 3 in *Dia. 3*. Would this have been more natural? If White is going to invade at 'a', it's only logical that it's better to have the White 'b'–Black 'c' exchange in place.



Dia. 3: an alternative strategy




Figure 3 (68–101)

Figure 3 (68–101). An unloseable game


When I extended to 80 in the centre and played atari at 86, I thought that the game was

unloseable. There's already a big difference in territory, and the balance of power in the centre also favours White.


The marked invasion stone aims at taking profit by harassing the black group above (*yoritsuki*), and at the same time also aims at attacking the black group below. There's no need to attack unreasonably. It's enough to make Black go to a bit of trouble to link up — White doesn't have to overdo things.

There's no way the game can be bad for White when he makes nice shape by extending at 80. Moreover, he's left with a cut at 94.

Instead of 83, Black would have liked to resist more strongly with 1 in *Dia. 4*, but White counters with 2 to 10, then —



Dia. 4: resistance...




Dia. 5: is futile

Dia. 5. Black can't get a good result after 6. If next Black 'a', the moves to White 'd' follow. That means that Black has no choice but to use 3 in *Dia. 4* to descend at 4; at that point, White can choose between capturing the three stones with 'a' and attacking further with 3, but the continuation will be difficult.

Seo compromised with 83, and staked his hopes on catching up later. However, White 86 makes White's lead evident, so he should have put in more analysis on connecting

with Black 84.

Black 89. This do-or-die move is shown as the marked stone in *Dia. 6*. Black can't afford to make the 'honest' connection at 'a', so he wants to provoke White into doing something. If White answers at 1, Black will be able to play — not now, perhaps, but later — 2 etc. White 'b' (90 in the figure), on the contrary, tries to provoke Black into making the first move.



Dia. 6: giving Black a chance





Figure 4 (102-124)

Figure 4 (102-124). The first misstep


When I broke through with 6 and 8, I thought the game was over. Everything looks promising for White. But the sequence from 10, especially 16 and 18, was uncalled-for.

Immediately after I thought the game was over, I started meddling where I shouldn't. This is a bad habit that may not be cured even when I die. Look at the position after Black 9 — it's shown in *Dia. 7*.



Dia. 7: a safe win for White

Dia. 7. The bottom black group has no eyes. White can also look forward to attacking the right-side group with 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c'. The four centre black stones may have cut White into two, but if anything they are a burden on Black. In contrast, White has no worries anywhere. Why? Why is it I couldn't play an ordinary move like 1?



Dia. 8: simpler

Next, cutting with 16 and 18 is also unnecessary. Because of this, White lets Black rap him on the head with 19 when there was no need for it. White should, of course, extend at 1 in *Dia. 8*. Black will have to go back to reinforce at 4, so White can play the *sen-ryo magari* [see the thickness article in this issue] of 5. Either *Dia. 7* or *Dia. 8* would have spelt trouble for Black.

Being able to make an unexpected break-

through has made this Mr. White facile. He may still have a big lead, but he couldn't complain if he lost through this kind of play. It makes you want to say: wake up to yourself!

White is compelled to play unpleasant moves at 20 and 22, on top of which his positions have become creaky. All of this can be blamed on 10 and 16.




Figure 5 (125-158)
ko: 36, 39, 58

Figure 5 (125-158). Inviting complications


Initially my policy was to discard the centre stones. However, the moves from 40 on are another uncalled-for sequence. The game has tumbled in a surprising direction.

After Black lives with 27 and 29, White makes his long-awaited attack with 30 and 32. If he can win and connect this ko, the black group will automatically die. Instead of 30, White could also cut at 44 in the centre, securing the capture of the four stones, but I thought that the sequence in the game would win more quickly.

When Black recaptures the ko with 39, we entered the lunch break. The position is shown in *Dia. 9*.

Dia. 9. I planned to sacrifice the 11 marked stones. If White wins the ko on the right side, the game will not be bad for him. Even if the centre white stones are captured, White is left with moves like 'a', 'b', and 'c',

so Black doesn't get such a big territory. The reader can confirm for himself that Black can't answer White 'b' by blocking or 'c' by cutting.



Dia. 9: my original plan

If we hadn't taken a lunch break just then, I would have played the ko threat of 1, then captured at 3. It may sound as if I'm making excuses, but this was my original plan.

White 40 is overdoing things yet again. This gives Black the chance to cut at 57, inviting complications. If Black finishes off the ko by capturing at A, he can then take away White's eyes with B. That would make it a different kind of ko, with a heavier burden on White.


I did have a reason for setting in motion with 40 the group I had been planning to sacrifice. If this group can avoid capture, I thought, I'd get ko threats against the black group at the bottom. However, this was quite unnecessary. I should, after all, have followed *Dia. 9*.

When I look back on the game now, when I look at the position calmly, I can see that it's not yet bad for White. But I can well understand my irritation at forsaking of my own free will the path of simplicity and choosing the difficult route. Putting the centre group in motion lets Black get a stone at 55, so now White has to worry about his eye shape if Black connects at C.

At this point let me touch on the bottom black group. White can attack it with the

clever-looking combination of 1 and 3 in *Dia.* 10, but Black calmly answers at 4, giving up two stones and living. Instead of 4 —

Dia. 11. If Black 1 here, White 2 is troublesome. If Black connects, White plays 'a'.



Dia. 10

Dia. 11




Figure 6 (159–182)

75: ko (above 72); 80: ko (at 72)


Figure 6 (159–182). An unthinking move loses the game.

The final losing move is White 82. From the middle game on, it was as if I was looking for a way to lose.


Instead of finishing off the ko with 60, I should have played at 1 in *Dia.* 12. If Black takes the ko with 2, White attaches at 3 — Black can't do anything, as he is threatened with White 'a'. If next Black 'b', White lives with 'c' — this is superior to the game. If Black makes some answer to White 1, the latter move will have made White's centre group more comfortable.

Because I connected at 60, Black turned first at 61, and White was put on the spot. White didn't want to attach at 66, as Black 67

and 69 made 71 all the more troublesome, but needs must when the devil drives.



Dia. 12: better for White



Dia. 13: White's last chance

White 74 and, finally, White 82 are the losing moves. If White had used either move to block at 1 in *Dia.* 13, the centre group would have been safe. Even if Black severs his connection with 2 and 4, White plays the sequence to 13 and lives, as 'a' and 'b' are *miai*. Even if the top left group is captured, White has caught the right-side black group, so, though the game is still difficult, White will probably prevail.

Actually I made a slip off the board. While manipulating the tournament clock to try to see how much time my opponent had left, I pushed a different button by mistake. I heard later that this did not amount to a breach of the rules, but during the game I thought that I had clearly breached them. I'm ashamed to say that this upset me.

Concluded on page 37

The Definition of Territory

by Ing Chang-Ki

The definition of territory determines the scoring of a go game. Various counting methods used nowadays include the Japanese method (JM) of comparing vacant points, the stone-counting methods (SCM) of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 A.D.), and the most recent fill-in-to-count (FITC) method. Due to the differences in the definition of territory, the results obtained by these methods are slightly different.

The so-called Japanese method of comparing vacant points is currently the most popular method being used. It was introduced to Europe and America by the Japanese. Players who were not familiar with the history of go misunderstood that this method was invented by the Japanese and named it the 'Japanese way of counting'. However, according to the research of Professor Yang Lien-Sheng of Harvard University, the JM was actually invented by the Chinese, and was widely practiced from the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.) through the early period of the Ming Dynasty. (As to what counting method was used before the Han Dynasty, there is no written record.) Approximately during the Nan-Pei Dynasty (the Southern and the Northern Kingdoms, 420–589 A.D.), this counting method was first introduced into Japan. For more than 1500 years these scoring rules remained unchanged. On the other hand, the Chinese had slowly switched to the stone-counting method after the Ming Dynasty. They had totally abandoned the method of comparing vacant points for about 600 years. The reason the Chinese had modified their counting method will be discussed later.

The definition of the JM is based on the concept of 'stone efficiency'. Therefore, it only considers vacant points surrounded by a live group of stones as territory. The stones and the vacant points within a *seki* are not counted. Such reasoning stemmed from the fact that the 'purpose' of the game is to secure territory (or

vacant points). The moves (or stones) are merely 'instruments' used to accomplish this 'purpose'. Therefore, one should only count the vacant points surrounded by the stones, but not the stones themselves. (By replacing the captured stones into the vacant points of the same color during counting, the number of black and white stones are considered to be *approximately* even. Therefore, there is no need to count the stones.) As mentioned before, the vacant points associated with a *seki* are also not counted as territory. The majority of go players don't understand the reason behind this. According to the Japanese, there are the following reasons: 1) *seki* is *rare* (who cares if the counting is not exact?); 2) even with the presence of *seki*, the number of vacant points associated (for both sides) are *approximately* the same; 3) *seki* is complicated and sometimes it is *not clear* who owns which vacant points. Since everything is an approximation to start with, why count the vacant points? For the sake of simplicity, one can apply this method, but it is far from precise. If one analyses this kind of counting scientifically, there are two main defects:

a) Theoretical Defect. Mathematically, it is not correct to assume that the number of stones (including captured stones) plus the vacant points associated with a *seki* are the same (for both sides). Thus, they should cancel out. If one argues that the stones are not counted, because they are not considered territory, then why doesn't one count the vacant points of a *seki*?

b) Practical Defect. Since stones are not counted, the actual territory becomes less if one places a stone in his own vacant space. During games, numerous disputes can arise because of this (e.g., a player refuses to eliminate a ko in his own territory). The only solution is to make various un-

reasonable adjudications for various situations (e.g., bent four in the corner is dead and not related to the game, etc.). In the two games played by Go Seigen against Iwamoto Kaoru and Takagawa Kaku, conflicting adjudications were given. This kind of defect is due to a lack of understanding of the definition of territory.

The stone-counting method of the Ming Dynasty is based on the concept of the 'survivability of the stones'. Except for the two basic eyes and shared spaces (of a *seki*), all stones and vacant points are counted as territory. The purpose of the game (according to this method) is to make as many stones survive on the board as possible (without killing your own groups). Therefore, the stones of a living group are automatically counted as territory. Besides the two basic eyes (for each living group) and the shared spaces (of a *seki*), one can fill all the rest of the vacant points with stones, so they are also counted as territory. The stone-counting method of the Ming Dynasty and the method of comparing vacant points are based on two completely opposite points of view. Let's summarize the advantages and disadvantages of the SCM:

1) **Advantages.** By counting stones instead of vacant points, one does not lose any points by playing within one's own territory. Without such disputes, there is no need for adjudications. This was the main reason why the Chinese switched from the JM to the SCM.

2) **Disadvantages.** Not counting eyes and shared spaces, SCM required a 'tax on groups': the players with more groups has to give up one stone (for the two eyes not counted) for every excess group. This method mixes the life and death of stones with the counting of territory. During the progress of the game, not placing stone(s) into one's basic eyes or shared spaces of a *seki* is understandable, but for the sake of counting there should be no problem. The eyes and the shared spaces are part of the living groups and should be scored as territory.

The fill-in-to-count method is based on the concept of 'the division of the board's intersections'. There are 361 intersections on the board. The purpose of the game is to capture as many intersections as possible. Any point out of the 361 should belong to either White or Black. In other words, the sum of the territories must equal 361 points, and the difference between the territories must equal the final score. This is simple and straightforward. With 180 each of Black and White stones, there is one vacant point left on the board after all the stones are filled in. The only vacant point left should lie in the winner's territory. The FITC method is simpler and more accurate than the JM. Unlike the SCM, the FITC method preserves the board position. The SCM generally destroys the position totally, and is not easy to double check results in case of disputes. The Japanese rules theorist Kaise Takaaki stressed that one should retain the JM because of its simplicity and beauty (neatness of the final board position). Indeed, simplicity, beauty and preciseness are the crucial requirements for any counting system.

The definitions of the three counting methods discussed in this article can be represented by the following equations, with T1, T2 and T3 being the scores of the JM, SCM and FITC respectively.

$$T_1 = P - (S + d)$$

$$T_2 = P - Q$$

$$T_3 = P$$

where P is the sum of the numbers of stones and vacant points, S is the number of stones, d is the number of vacant points associated with a *seki*, and Q is the number of eyes and shared spaces. Note that from the above equations $T_3 - T_1 = S + d$ and $T_3 - T_2 = Q$. The difference in score between FITC and JM is the number of stones plus the vacant points of a *seki*. The difference in score between FITC and SCM is the number of eyes and shared spaces.

Finally, I should like to summarize the three counting methods discussed in this article together with an illustration of the following diagrams:




Diagram 1	Black's Territory
JM	2
SCM	6
FITC	8

Diagram 2	Black's Territory	White's Territory
JM	0	0
SCM	12	6
FITC	14	8

Diagram 3	Black's Territory	White's Territory		
	Seki	Total Territory	Seki	Territory of the live group
JM	0	15	0	15
SCM	43	36	3	33
FITC	44.5	39.5	4.5	35

1) The JM Method of Comparing Vacant Points. This method counts the vacant points within the living groups as territory. The vacant points of a *seki* are not considered as territory. The number of stones on both sides are assumed to be equal and thus not counted.

2) The SCM of the Ming Dynasty. This method counts both the stones and vacant

points as territory, except the two basic eyes required for each living group and the shared spaces.

3) FITC Method. This method considers all the stones and vacant points as territory. The sum of territory for both sides is equal to 361 points.

(Translated by Sidney W. K. Yuan)

What Players Should Know About the Ing Rules

by Yang Yu-Chia

1) Begin the Game with an Empty Board. For both even and handicap games, the board is empty at the outset. Traditional Chinese rules required setup stones to start the game.

Japanese rules require setup stones for handicap games, but not for even games. The rule on setup stones reduces the possible variations of the game and is unreasonable.

2) **All Moves that Result in Variations are Allowed.** Other than the invariations due to the immediate recapturing of a *ko* stone or cyclic capturing of *ko* stones, all moves are allowed. There is no other restriction on making a move on the board; the fewer restrictions, the more variations.

3) **Rules on Pass Plays.** A pass play is allowed subject to one of the following conditions:

- a) A one-sided pass play signalling resignation — the game ends.
- b) A non-resigning one-sided pass play — the game continues.
- c) After filling all the neutral points, both sides make a pass play — the game adjourns. The game resumes if there is dispute over life and death.
- d) After removing all dead stones, both sides make another pass play — the game ends. The game ends with four consecutive pass plays and the board is ready for fill-in to count.

4) **Stones With No Liberties Are Captured.** There are three requirements for capturing:

- a) No liberties associated with the stone(s) being captured.
- b) The capturing move must provide a variation to the board position.
- c) Both self-capturing and the capturing of the opponent's stones are allowed. (Traditional rules only require captured stones to have no liberties, and do not require variation after capturing or allow self-capturing.)

5) **Determine Life and Death by Capturing.** The life and death of stones should be determined by the type of liberties associated with them. If there is any dispute, one must verify by capturing, without special rulings. Requiring variation after capturing and counting both stones and vacant points are the prerequisites for determining life and death by capturing.

6) **Avoid Invariation by Ko.** Kos can be

classified into Ko Fights or Disturbing Kos. There are three types of Ko Fights:

- a) A single *ko* with a hot stone.
- b) Eternal Ko with double hot stones.
- c) Triple Ko with twin hot stones

Hot stones cannot be captured unless after an intervening play (either a board play or a pass play).

There are three types of Disturbing Kos:

- a) Disturbed life of a *seki*.
- b) Disturbed death of a dead group.
- c) Self-capturing of a single stone. A disturber who extends the cyclic capturing moves into the second cycle (which results in invariation) must be stopped. Other than the rule for a single *ko*, traditional rules adjudicate all the other cases as games with no outcome.

7) **Fill-in to Count Points.** The standard for counting territory in the Ing Rules is to count both stones and vacant points (surrounded by these stones). The procedure for counting requires the filling in of all stones. With the use of the measuring device, 180 each of black and white stones are ensured during each game. After fill-in, the score of the game is clearly displayed. Even children can obtain the score at a glance, without cumbersome arithmetic.

8) **Black Gives Back Eight Compensation Points.** In even games, Black has to give White eight points as compensation. In case of a tied game Black wins. This system was determined scientifically according to the following two reasons:

- a) In several tens of thousands of games in over ten years, the winning percentage for Black when giving 8 points compensation is approximately 50%.
- b) Currently, the handicap between a 9-dan professional and a 1-dan professional is two stones. Two stones divided by eight levels is $1/4$. The difference between each dan is $1/4$ stones or 2 points. This agrees with the winning percentage of Black giving 8 compensation points.

(Translated by Sidney W.K. Yuan)

6th Fujitsu Cup Final A New Hero for Korea



Yoo Chang-hyeok
1993 Fujitsu World Champion

1993 was Korea's year of triumph in international go. As far as go fans from other countries were concerned, perhaps the most unexpected contribution to that triumph was the one made by Yoo Chang-hyeok 6-dan. Born in 1966, Yoo did not become a professional until 1984, after taking 2nd place in that year's World Amateur Go Championship. He first made a name for himself in 1990, when he defeated Cho Hun-hyun to win the Kisung (= Kisei) title. Since then he has won a couple more titles (unfortunately, we do not have detailed information) and has established himself as the fourth member of the quartet that dominates Korean go.

By winning the 6th Fujitsu Cup, he became the fourth Korean player to take an international title and so maintained parity with the other three top Koreans. His victory has an additional significance, however, for he is the first non-Nihon Ki-in player to win the Fujitsu Cup. Until now, the Koreans have tended to win the Korean-sponsored international tournaments and Nihon Ki-in players the Japanese-sponsored one (the Koreans also have monopolized the Taiwanese-sponsored Ing Cup, of course).

Last year the prize money for first place was increased to ¥20 million (about \$190,000), a little under half that for the Ing Cup and not too far behind that for the third-ranked Japanese newspaper title, the Honinbo. Second prize is ¥7,000,000. Third prize (which went to Kato Masao) is ¥4,000,000 and fourth (Awaji Shuzo) is ¥2,000,000.

The commentary below is taken from the Yomiuri Newspaper account of the game. Note that we spell that players' names as below in order to maintain consistency with past *Go Worlds*, but frankly we have to admit that Korean names baffle us. Just for the record, the names were spelt Cho Hoonhwan and Yoo Changhyuk in the tournament program. (Editor)

White: Yoo Chang-hyeok 6-dan (Korea)
Black: Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan (Korea)
Played on 3 July 1993.




Figure 1 (1-15)

Figure 1 (1-15). A popular Korean move

'This championship game is not generating much excitement in Korea,' said Yoon Ki-hyun, the 9-dan Korean team captain.

'With Koreans playing for the title, you'd expect the game to be carried live on TV, but today it's only being reported on the sports news. Apparently there's no thrill for the Korean go fans, since they'll be satisfied regardless of who wins.'

After Yoo's opening *sanrensei*, identical patterns appeared in the top right, bottom left, and bottom right. Whether from stubbornness or fighting spirit, this made a curious opening. Normally Black plays 11 at 'a'.

Yoo thought for one minute about Black 15. He was not inclined to answer White 14 at 'b' (because that would let White extend to 'c'). The attachment at 15 is popular in Korea, and Yoo is a master at using it.




Figure 2 (15-33)

Figure 2 (15-33). *An ally in Zen?*

Yoo was having a good year in 1993, with 44 wins and 13 losses so far. He was currently challenging Lee Chang-ho for the Myungin (Meijin) title.

'Yoo has been practicing Zen meditation,' said Yoon. 'Perhaps as a result, he's started to win close games. Before that he was an attacker, and the close games got away from him.' Yoo's victories in the quarterfinal and semifinal rounds of the Fujitsu Cup this year were both by half a point.

White would like to play 18 at 21, but that turns out badly when Black cuts at 'a'. Black 21 took a key point and forced White 22, making White's original slide look

ridiculous.

In a public commentary at the Nihon Ki-in, Takemiya Masaki 9-dan criticized White 24 as an overplay (it should have been at 33). Coming to White 32, he said, 'I'd never play that kind of move as long as I live. Why didn't White play 'b'?'

Around this point the going seems to get tough for White.





Figure 3 (33-48)



Dia. 1

Figure 3 (33-48). *Large profit*

Cho reads quickly, so he is a fast player, but Yoo is even faster. Through Black 33, Yoo had used only 30 minutes and Cho only 36. The latter thought for 17 minutes, however, before capturing at White 38. He wanted to connect at 39, but that loses the capturing race shown in Dia. 1.

Yoo secured a large profit by cutting at Black 39, except that 'secured' is the wrong word. After repeated upheavals later on, the entire right side and lower right were trans-

formed into white territory, while the white group that looked so strong after White 38 died.

Takemiya: 'This isn't a bad result for Black, but White would have been in trouble if Black had just jumped to 38 instead of playing 33 and 35. Black 33 and 35 were emergency moves, the kind of moves you play when you're behind.'

White pressed at 40, but had a cutting point left at 'a'. Black maintained his lead with 41.





Figure 4 (49-84)



Dia. 2

Figure 4 (49-84). Aggressive play by both sides

An hour after the game started, Cho and Yoo were both perched cross-legged on their chairs. Korean players like this posture, but the chairs were a little too small, and they looked uncomfortable.

Black 55 was Yoo's first slow move (19 minutes). Ishida Yoshio 9-dan commented that 'Black would normally play 62, but

Black 55 gives Black more space after White 57 and Black 56.'

Cho resisted by playing 56 himself, letting Black have 57. White 66, attacking Black's eye space, was strong, but so were Black 67 and 69.

Ishida: 'Black could have played safe with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*, but he may have been worried about a white invasion at 4.'

White wanted to attack with 70 at 72, but apparently that doesn't work. Black 83 took an ideal point. Cho could not afford to let Black have all the right-side territory, so he came in at White 84.




Figure 5 (84-122)

Figure 5 (84-122). Black clearly ahead . . .

Cho was doing his best to catch up, but Yoo was relentlessly keeping up the pressure. Nothing like a chance presents itself to Cho.

Ishida: 'The trouble with White 84 is that Black 85 forces White to play toward his own thickness with 86 and 88.' White would have preferred to invade around 'a', but he never got the chance.

Black 89 was another good point. Perhaps now abandoning his plans to surround the center, Cho ignored it to play a large territorial move at White 90, but Black 91 punished him severely. Black was not just reducing White's center: he was attacking it. When White defended with 92 to 100, Black was able to seal off the right side.

Ishida: 'White had to play 110 at 111. That may not give him a good game, but it offers more scope for variation. White 110 made Black connect at 111, which is exactly what Black wanted to do.'

Black 121 was *sente*, threatening 122. Black was now clearly in the lead, but the tumult was yet to come.




Figure 6 (123-160)
59: connects (at 42)

Figure 6 (123-160). Prelude . . .

No problems arise in this figure . . .




Figure 7 (161-200)
81: connects (left of 79); 98: ko (at 92)

Figure 7 (161-200). An enormous trade

When Black played 73, Ishida calculated that he had 85 points of territory to White's 70. 'If Black hadn't tried to do anything more,' he said, 'the game would have been over.'

The tumult began with Black 79. Ignoring White 80, Black played the seemingly lethal sequence from 81 to 87, but Cho was ready with White 88 and 90, starting a large *ko*.




Figure 8 (201-250)

20: connects (diagonally right of 19); 39: ko

Figure 8 (201-250). Black's lead is confirmed.

Yoo won it with Black 3, capturing the center group, but Cho captured the top right with White 4. Since he had also lived in the bottom right, the exchange was greatly in his favor. Black still led, but not by much, and Yoo's ears were turning crimson.

Black 11 may have been played to gain thinking time. Cho ignored it to wedge in at White 12, taking complete possession of the right side, but that let Black capture four stones in *sente* with 13. Black's gain outweighed White's, and Black's lead widened again.

Figure 9 (251-310). A new number one

Cho looked doubtful when the score was counted. After taking the top right, he must have felt sure of victory and played on without counting accurately. Exhaustion may have been a factor, since Cho is over 40

years old and plays 70 or 80 professional games a year. Two years ago, in another Fujitsu Cup game (against O Rissei — see GW65), he had captured a large group, then made compromises without bothering to count and been upset at the very end.

Ishida called this game a total loss for Cho. White fell behind early in the lower right and stayed behind from then on. The variations that develop from Black's contact play at 15 are an uncharted realm, but Ishida thought White should have played 20 at 21.

Yoo won a total victory, giving a demonstration of Korean power and becoming the first Fujitsu Cup-winner of non-Japanese affiliation.

Black wins by 6½ points.

(Yomiuri Shimbun. Translated by James Davies.)




Figure 8 (251-310)

ko: 57, 60, 63; 71: ko (at 65)

78: ko (at 54); 80: ko (at 68); 92: connects (at 65)

101: ko (at 95); 104: ko (at 98)

106: connects (at 95); 108: connects (below 54)

2nd Ing Cup Final

Continued from page 28

Figure 7 (184-219). A deserved loss

Once Black cuts with the marked stone (83 in Figure 6), White can't win the *semeai*. White 1 and 3 in Dia. 14 lead to a *ko* after 4; even if Black answers 5 with an *atari* at 'a',

White has to connect at 4; after Black 'b' and White 4, Black fills a liberty at 'c' and wins. Black 'd' is *sente* against the two marked white stones, so playing 3 at 4 is no good: Black attaches at 'e'.





Figure 7 (184-219)

90: ko (below 87); 100: connects (right of 86)

ko (over 87): 105, 110, 113

117: connects (below 87)



Dia. 14: White loses

Missing Dia. 7 ruined my game. I deserved to lose.

White resigns after Black 219.


(Kido, July 1993. Translated by John Power.)

The Myriad Shapes of Go


by Sato Masaharu 9-dan

This is the final instalment in this series. To finish off, we look at some interesting tsume-go or life-and-death positions. They get harder as they go along, and we're sure we have some surprises even for veteran problem-solvers.

Black to play in all problems.




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
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Problem 1: Black to kill White. This is a composition by the late Maeda Nobuaki, who was known as 'the god of tsume-go'. The vital point should be obvious.

Problem 2: Black to live. A ko is not good enough: Black can live outright.




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
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Problem 3: Black to kill White. There is a famous tesuji involved here. If you've seen it before, the problem is easy; if not, you'll have to think a little. Once again, a ko is not good enough.

Problem 4: Black to kill White. The problems are starting to get more difficult. Should Black attack from the outside or the inside?



5



6

Problem 5: Black to kill White. This is another famous position. The solution involves a startling combination that you won't forget once you've seen it.

Problem 6: Black to kill White. We've saved the best for last, but we won't be surprised if you give up before you find the answer. The first move is one of the most surprising moves you're likely to see in a life-and-death problem.

Answers on page 43.

A Taste for Thickness


by Kudo Norio 9-dan

In this issue we present the third and fourth parts of a six-part series on the virtues of thickness. In Part 3 we look at the magari, a solid turning move that often plays a very effective role in building thickness. Part 4 focuses on the ponuki, a shape which is the epitome of thickness. We hope that our discussion helps you acquire a taste for thickness.

3. The magari


The magari is a move that presses down the opponent's head. Literally, it means 'turning', as in 'turning a corner'. Sometimes it is so valuable that it is called the *sen-ryo magari*, 'the thousand-ryo magari', ryo being a coin used in the Edo period.

We will look at three josekis that involve *magari*, diagrams A, B, and C. Before reading on, see if you can appreciate just how thick these moves are.




Dia. A

Dia. A. White 1 is a powerful *magari*. The marked white stone is caught in a ladder, but it is still useful, acting as a constraint on Black. It helps to make White 1 more than an ordinary *magari*.



Dia. B

Dia. B. White 1 prevents Black from developing towards the centre. At the same time, of course, it turns the centre into White's sphere of influence.




Dia. C

Dia. C. Though this *magari* is similar to the one in Dia. A, it partakes more of the

nature of a vital point. However, you can't fully appreciate the virtues of the *magari* in a purely local context, so next we will look at the *magari* in Dias. A and B in full-board positions.

Pattern 1: Equivalent to a large fuseki point

Dia. 1 (*moyo expansion and contraction*). Here we have constructed a whole-board position that includes Dia. A. Various large *fuseki* points or *oba* strike the eye, but White 1 is as valuable a point as any of them.



Dia. 1


White 1 not only strengthens and expands the right-side *moyo*, but also prevents the black *moyo* from expanding into the centre. White 1 will also exert its power if a fight arises in the centre.

Of course, White 1 won't always be a thousand-ryo *magari*. In this position, the fact that it works in concert with the marked white stone on the top right is significant; if this stone were not present, the value of 1 would be halved.

Dia. 2 (*flattened out*). How about occupying one of those large *fuseki* points we referred to, for example, White 1 here?

Black will need no second invitation to push up at 2. White must now extend at 3. Even with the addition of 2, the *magari* of White 'a' will be a thick move, but there's no denying that it looks quite inferior to 1 in the previous diagram. The right-side *moyo* has also been reduced in scale, and the pulse of the marked white stone is much weaker. I


hope that you can appreciate the difference in forcefulness between these two *magari*.



Dia. 2

Pattern 2: Controlling the centre

Dia. 3 (satisfactory for White). We have expanded the position in Dia. B. Black has just extended to 1. Responding to this by turning at 2 is essential, a move that must not be missed. If White plays anywhere else, Black will play at 4: that attacks White, expands Black's *moyo* — at one stroke makes the game bad for White.




Dia. 3

The idea is to play 2 to 6 in *sente*, then invade at 8. If Black 'a', White can live with 'b'; laying waste to the corner prevents Black from getting significant territory at the bottom. On the other hand, White has built in-

fluence in the centre, and that influence affects the top also.

We should conclude from this result that Black 1 was a dubious move.




Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (on a grand scale). Playing the knight's move of 1 takes priority. Even if White makes a pincer at 2, the corner stone is not yet captured: it can live with 'a'.


More important, playing the Takemiya-style move of 3 breathes life into the *moyo*. Looking at this diagram should bring home to you how much of a vital point 2 in Dia. 3 was. You must take care not to let your opponent play such powerful moves.

Pattern 3: A big difference

Dia. 5 (after the atari). Let's have another look at Dia. C. Black 1 is an *atari*, so anyone would play here. But now it's easy to overlook how big 'a' is. In thickness, the *magari* of White 'a' is similar to the one in Dia. A. The problem comes up when Black pushes up at 1 in Dia. 6.




Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Dia. 6 (the atari). Black 1 carries with it a bonus: the *atari* at 'a'. That means that 1 in *Dia. C* is a really big move; unless there's an urgent point elsewhere, you should play it.

Let's conclude with an example from a game.



Dia. 7

White: Kobayashi Kisei; Black: Kato 9-dan


Dia. 7 (the position transformed). Before White played 1, the game had looked promising for him, yet the flow abruptly changed when Black turned at 2. Black 2 is a *senryo-magari* if ever there was one. It weakens the white group above and makes Black thick in the centre. When Kobayashi played 1, he expected to be able to harass the black group on the side above, but actually there's no really effective attack he can make. White 1 had to be at 'a'.

4. The *ponnuki*


The *ponnuki* is the most efficient way of capturing an enemy stone; also, the shape the capture creates is exactly that of an eye, so what more could you want? That's the reason for the proverb, 'the *ponnuki* is worth 30 points'.

Pattern 1: Capture the cutting stone

Dia. 1 (inviting a cut). The *hane* of 4 purposely creates two cutting points, at 'a' and 'b'; White is inviting Black to cut. This is a standard *sabaki* technique.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Dia. 2 (efficient). The idea is to capture the cutting stone. If Black 1 here, White lives in the corner by capturing the stone. White may dislike losing the stone on the outside in a ladder, but he mustn't use 2 to connect at 3.


Dia. 3 (building thickness). If Black cuts on the outside with 1 here, White captures with 2 and is satisfied. Pushing up at 6 makes White thick. Omitting it would let Black press at 'a', forcing White to answer submissively at 'b'. That would be painful, as the *ponnuki* goes to waste.




Dia. 3

Pattern 2: Making a trade

Dia. 4 (blocking the incursion). White has slid with the marked stone. This incursion bothers a lot of people, so they try to block its path by attaching at 1. They perhaps figure that if White cuts with 2 and 4, they can resist with 5 to 9. However, after White 10 this looks like quite a tough fight for Black. But instead of this sequence —




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (disadvantageous for Black). You should realize that in most cases permitting White 2 is bad. After White captures with 6, Black can hardly hope to attack this group, nor can he mount an effective attack against the white group to the right. That means he's gained nothing by splitting White into two and has lost a lot.



Dia. 6

Dia. 6 (the right way to block). If Black wants to block White's path in, the correct procedure is to peep at 1, then attach on the other side at 3. Up to 9 Black makes good shape. The only problem is that the thin white group has also been stabilized, so Black should not blindly follow this strategy in all situations.




Dia. 7


Dia. 7 (what to do?). White 1 finishes off a *joseki*. But what if Black insists that the *joseki*

is not over and attaches at 2?

Dia. 8 (not alive). Probably the first thing many players will consider is trying to live with 1 and 3. Or perhaps some players will play 1 and 3 as an automatic reflex and then start thinking. At this point, they realize that White can't live — if White 'a', Black 'b' — but it's too late.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9


Dia. 9 (sacrifice). White's original position here is one in which it's very hard to secure life; at times like this, he should take advantage of the opportunity offered by Black to go for a trade. He can be satisfied with the *ponnuki* to 5. Black's gain amounts to about 20 points. The thickness White builds up to 9 is worth just as much. In fact, you could say that Black 2 in *Dia. 7* is premature.

Pattern 3: A professional goes wrong


Dia. 10 (favourable for Black). This is an example of a *ponnuki* from professional play. White 1 is the premise for the *atari* at 3. However, Black doesn't try to escape, so an exchange follows.

The result is good for Black. Both sides capture a stone, but White has the superfluous marked stone, so his capture is not a *ponnuki*. Black has played more efficiently, on top of which his *ponnuki* faces the centre, giving his thickness more scope to work. It

influences not only the bottom — making the pincer of 8 a good move — but even the left side. Instead of 4 —




Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Dia. 11 (what White wants). If Black escapes with 1, White pokes his head out with 2 and 4. Black has a defect at 'a', so he will fall behind in this fight.



Dia. 12


Dia. 12 (an even result). To go back to the beginning, White should have played the *atari* at 1 immediately, omitting 1 in Dia. 10. He moves out with 3 and 5 and gets an even result. Alternatively, he could play 1 at 'a'.

(Kido, September and October 1992)


The Myriad Shapes of Go Answers

Problem 1

Dia. 1. The placement of 1 is obviously the vital point. If Black permits White to play here, he can't kill him even with two successive moves.




Dia. 1: the vital point




Dia. 2: wrong

Dia. 2. If next Black pushes in at 3, White calmly plays 4, making *miai* of 'a' and 'b'. He lives.

Dia. 3. Black 3 is a stylish *tesuji*. After Black 5, White is dead because of shortage of liberties. If White plays 4 at 5, it's easy: Black 'a' creates a snapback. This is a characteristic Maeda problem, and here's another.



Dia. 3: tesuji




Dia. 4: Black to play


Dia. 4. How can Black live? We don't give the answer, so you have to work it out for yourself.

Problem 2

Dia. 1. Since his stone's in *atari*, common sense would seem to dictate that Black capture at 1. After 2, he ataris at 3, then —




Dia. 1: common sense?




Dia. 2: alive, but —

Dia. 2. Black has the clever move of 7, so he lives, but this is not the correct answer.

Dia. 3. Instead of 2 in *Dia. 1*, White will play 2 and 4 here. The result is a *ko*. If Black plays 5 at 'a', White connects at 'b', and Black dies because of shortage of liberties.




Dia. 3: dead




Dia. 4: the tesuji

Dia. 4. The surprising answer is to descend at 1. This may seem ridiculous, as White simply captures with 'a', but —

Dia. 5. If White 1, Black plays 2 and 4, and the point of the sacrifice becomes apparent. Next —



Dia. 5: sacrifice



Dia. 6: alive

Dia. 6. If White plays at 5 to stop Black from getting two eyes, Black ataris at 6, and


White can't capture. This problem may be artificial, but it's interesting nonetheless.

Problem 3


Dia. 1. There are only six points Black can play, so you should be able to find the right answer by eliminating the wrong ones. However, your intuition might tell you the right answer immediately.

Black 'a' lets White get a snapback with White 1; Black 'b' lets White live by playing 'a'. That might seem to leave only Black 1 as a reasonable candidate, but it lets White get a *ko* with 2. This is wrong.


Dia. 2. Black 1 is the surprising answer. This is a very clever move.




Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: correct



Dia. 3: dead




Dia. 4: a false eye

Dia. 3. If White 2, Black cuts at 3, and White can't *atari* because of shortage of liberties. The exchange of 1 for 2 is effective.


Dia. 4. If White answers at 2, Black 3 makes this a false eye. If White 2 at 'a', Black captures at 2 and kills White with a *nakade*.

Problem 4

Dia. 1. Black 1 is an impressive move. It's not the place one usually looks for the solution to a life-and-death problem.




Dia. 1: unexpected




Dia. 2: dead

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black ataris again at 3, then pulls back with 5. White is dead. This way it's too easy for Black, so —

Dia. 3. White may try capturing at 2. Black's answer is to play from a distance with 3. If instead Black plays at 'a', White plays 'b', and Black can no longer kill him.



Dia. 3: from a distance




Dia. 4: dead


Dia. 4. White plays 4 in an attempt to set up an *oi-otoshi*, but that doesn't work, as he can't *atari* at 'a'.

White might also try the *tesuji* of wedging in at 9 instead of 4, but if Black calmly answers at 'b', he will get the same result as in this diagram.

Dia. 5. If Black starts with 1, White lives with 2. Black 1 at 'a' would also let White live with 1.



Dia. 5: alive




Dia. 6: alive


Dia. 6. If Black starts with 1, he has no follow-up after White 2 — if Black 'a', White 'b'.

Problem 5

Dia. 1. The usual approach might be to push in at 1, but after White 2 and 4 Black finds he can't go any further. White lives when he plays 'a'. If Black 1 at 2, White lives with 'a'.




Dia. 1: alive




Dia. 2: tesuji?

Dia. 2. The contact play of 1 looks like a *tesuji*, but when White cuts at 4 he lives in similar fashion to Dia. 1.

Dia. 3. The correct move is the throw-in at 1. If you found this move, you can be proud of your intuition — or your analytical ability, depending on how you found the move.




Dia. 3: the throw-in




Dia. 4: follow-up

Dia. 4. If White captures at 2, the contact play of 3 now works. If White 4 —

Dia. 5. Black plays 5 to 9, and now the point of the throw-in becomes clear: White can't *atari* at 'a' because of shortage of liberties.



Dia. 5: dead




Dia. 6: ko


Dia. 6. Actually the correct answer for White is to play a ko with 2. At any rate, I think you'll agree that Black 1 is a dramatic move.

Answer to Problem 6

Dia. 1. This time we'll give the correct answer straight off. It's Black 1, which is the opposite of dramatic. This move may seem slow, but it is the only way of killing White.




Dia. 1: slow but deadly



Dia. 2: resistance

Dia. 2. White 2 offers the strongest resistance. When White plays 4, he seems to get a lot of room for eye space, but —




Dia. 3: sacrifice


Dia. 3. Black attacks with 5 and 7. White

tries for a *seki* with 8, but Black foils that by cutting at 9. After 12 —

Dia. 4. Black plays inside at 13, killing White. Note that playing 13 at 'a' would be a mistake: White plays 13, then recaptures two stones after Black captures five stones (the *ishi-no-shita tesuji*).




Dia. 4: dead



Dia. 5: dead

Dia. 5. If White 2, Black kills him with 3. If Black played 1 at 'a', however, White would live with 2.



Dia. 6: alive

Dia. 6. If Black starts out with 1, White lives with 2. Black 1 in Dia. 1 is the only way to kill White. It's not often that such a 'quiet' move, simply filling in an outside liberty, kills a group like this. This is a strange problem.

Well, that concludes our series. We can't claim that we have fully lived up to our title, but we have certainly looked at some of the more interesting specimens among the myriad shapes of go.

(Igo Club, June 1991)

The Earth, the Dead and the Darkness

A Speculative Essay on the Creation of Go in Early China

by Peter Shotwell

'Beware of the explanation of the obscure by the even more obscure.'
— Bob High (1946–1993)

I. Down to Earth

Most go books begin with stories of how King Yao (c. 2100 B.C.) invented go to sharpen the mind of his 'idiot' son Danju. One or two mention an earlier episode, that of a musician-sorcerer suddenly sprouting insect wings and flying up to the top of a mountain to play go. (This is supposed to indicate go's shamanistic origins.) Then they go on to talk about how the Yao story is probably false, that the Han Dynasty writers put it into the legend later, and that go probably started with divination rituals involving the throwing of black and white stones (which are supposed to represent stars) down on a chart of the sky. From the readings of the 'meaning' of the resulting patterns, which resembled the constellations, a game is supposed to have evolved, perhaps as a contest between rival interpreters. Go is a mystical game, these books will tell us — the entire cosmos is involved every time you sit down to play.

Well, obviously, this essay is starting with Yao also, but I would like to pause a bit and stay more or less on the ground before taking off for the stars.

Let's look at King Yao. According to the earliest records, Yao was the original 'civilizer' of Chinese civilization, coming in the middle of a series of legendary 'Golden Age' kings. He had no ancestral family ties and he came from heaven. There are many versions of what he did, which were written down at various times in Chinese history. These different versions, written of course with varying motives, were always supposed to have been based on earlier texts which had been lost.

One of the things he or his immediate successors did was to kill or exile most of the advisors that he employed to invent or do things for him. Also, he had many sons. The one by his first wife was named Danju.

Danju was not an 'idiot', as the go histories say — the exact meaning of the adjective describing him is that he was 'quarrelsome', or 'disorderly'. He was quarrelsome, quite possibly with the other sons, by other mothers, who also wanted to inherit the throne. And Yao, with his all-seeing wisdom, taught his son only one thing in life. 'To quiet him down', he taught him how to play go.

Apparently, this had no effect. In fact, according to one source, after becoming a good (or perhaps the 'best') player, Danju got bored and invented his own game of 'chess'. He and his friends used live elephants and rhinoceroses and they charged around on a large 'board-field' specially planted with mulberry trees. Yao tired of Danju, so he disinherited him and passed the kingdom to his friend Shun, who founded the first dynasty of China, the Hsia. Danju went south and allied with the Sanmiao tribe and fought Shun and finally died.

There are a number of strange things about this story, not the least being that there are perhaps a half-dozen versions. For example, one is that Shun stole the kingdom and Danju righteously tried to get it back. But the story that has lasted, that of the Confucian historian Ssu-Ma Ch'ien of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.), is that Danju did not respect his father, therefore the latter's only choice was to disinherit him, painful as it was. It has become one of the classic 'filial son' stories that the

Chinese, especially the Confucians, have passed on from generation to generation for thousands of years.

For a long time, some sinologists have been doing exploratory work on what they call the 'euhemerization' (or 'reverse-euhemerization') of Chinese myths. That is, what the Greeks did was 'euhemerize' their history by using it as a basis for making up their myths. The Chinese, in particular the Confucians of the Han Dynasty, did the reverse — they historicized their myths. For example, one of the ministers that Yao hired to control the famous annual floods of the Yellow River was named Kung Kung. To make a long story short, Kung Kung's method failed and he was driven out of the kingdom. This is all very straightforward until we learn through etymological analysis that 'Yao' was derived from 'mountain' and 'Kung Kung' from 'disruly' or 'quarrelsome', and that this last adjective was especially applied to describe the raging flood waters of the Yellow River. In fact, one leading sinologist suggested that Kung Kung *was* the flood and that Yao subdued him — the Confucians who wrote down the myth had changed it from a story of two gods fighting each other (Kung Kung was probably originally a river god) to a bureaucratic dispute over management problems in a virtuous government. (1)

There are other things to think about. Who would teach his son only one thing? How would go 'quiet him down?' Why go? Moreover, in the Yao story, did go already exist? In Ssu-Ma Ch'ien's history, it does not say that Yao invented the game, so who taught Yao?

There are also peculiarities in the general form of this story. While Yao came from the heavens, Danju was associated with water. One of the various interpretations of his name is 'Red Pearl' and he liked to sail around on his boat, even after the floods were tamed — that is, the peasants had to push his boat across the now-dried fields while he and his cohorts partied on board. When he fought Yao, he could give his Sanmiao allies — whose descendants became seamen — magical properties for walking and fighting on the water. Shun, on the other hand, was definitely of the earth (and human) — he had many problems with his

parents and spent lots of time performing agricultural tasks before he came to the throne.

We must remember that any speculation about this period in China is just that — speculation. Not only were these myths layered over and changed after they came into being, but the characters involved probably came from many different 'tribes' (the concept is unclear in early China) and represent amalgamations of real persons, concepts and lineages. For example, Yao was originally the first 'civilizer', but the Chou people put others before him so they could claim that their lineages were more ancient than those of the Shang, whom they conquered in 1046 B.C. In the first written versions (not necessarily the oldest or the principal ones), Yao was not exactly a king and there was no abdication. Despite these problems, when all the extant versions are looked at for similarities, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the original story is about the 'control of the flood'. In no version, for example, does Danju become king.



Another strange thing about this story is that go figures in only one of the Yao variations. Moreover, in other histories, the invention of the game is attributed in one case to Shun, or one of his ministers, and in the other to a later king. Nevertheless, I think that the creation and subsequent appearance of go in the Yao legend took place in either the Hsia Dynasty (c. 2100–c. 1600 B.C.), the first dynasty of China, or during the succeeding Shang Dynasty (1600–1046 B.C.). It was not introduced by the Chou (1046–771 B.C.), or in the following 'Spring and Autumn' (770–476 B.C.) and 'Warring States' (476–221 B.C.) periods or during the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–230 A.D.), as the go histories would have it.

Go seems to be a 'sacred' game. The gods of the later periods lived in the sky among the stars, but the spiritual interests of the first two dynasties were in the earth and in the first Great Division in Chinese mythology: the separation of the earth from the waters. Go is an 'earth' game and not a game of the sky.

The Earth Theory

The most important reason for thinking this way is that the go board is square and this is the shape of the earth in traditional Chinese thinking. Here is a 'shih board' on which the

stones were supposed to have been cast in sky-divination rituals according to the go book theories.



Drawing of a shih board

The patterns the stones made were supposed to have inspired the shaman throwing them — or the children watching them — to create a game.

There is considerable academic debate on how *shih* boards operated because only pieces remain of them. In the beginning issues of the journal *Early China*, a discussion took place over whether they could be game boards (not for go), and the consensus was that they were not. The circular tops represented the sky, the squares below the earth. On the tops of them, there seem to have been a spoon-shaped compass needle and a circular part that apparently moved. The important point is that there were no co-ordinates drawn on either the sky or the earth parts of the earliest boards. The upper halves of the oldest ones found (c. 200 B.C.) had stars and constellations, the lower halves had the eight directions engraved around the edges, so even if the bottom halves were used alone, they didn't seem to function or look anything like a go board. Moreover, the first record of any stone casting onto the *shih*

boards for divination purposes (not go stones and not onto the lower half) does not come until the latter part of the Han dynasty (c. 1 A.D.). There are Western Chinese and Tibetan tribes that throw colored stones down on the earth to divine, but their systems are time- and fate-oriented and not direction-based; they do not use a board.

The next point to consider is that, according to some of the legends, it was Yu the Great, appointed by Yao in some versions and in others by Shun (and who preceded them in other variants), who finally controlled the floods. How did he do this? Previous to this, 'snakes, dragons and grasses overwhelmed the land, and men could not survive there.' Attempts either by Kung Kung, or by Yu's father (who was executed), used brute force, as they tried to dam the river up, thereby causing even more flooding when the dams broke. Yu's method, on the other hand, was to siphon off the force by digging many irrigation ditches and letting the flooding waters disperse in an orderly fashion over the landscape.

When you look at a go board, it is very easy to think of neat irrigation ditches surrounding fields, isn't it?

If the lines on the go board 'represent' channels of irrigation, what happens when you place a stone down? You dam up the water. You put some more stones down and you dam up more water but you control it, of course, meaning that you control the land — the squares — in-between the channels. It is yours. As in go, the more 'territory' you control, the better off you are.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that this pattern would have had a great deal of meaning for a society living in an agricultural floodland, whose primary interest was not the stars but the basic divisions of land and water and how to use them. It is easy to imagine that their myth-tellers would place the context of its invention (which was probably accidental) into the primeval battles of the gods that told the story of the original separation of these elements.

One can speculate further if so inclined. The floods in China were never from rainfall, and there is a traditional Chinese belief that there is water under all the land of China. After controlling the wild waters, Yu divided

up China into nine great sections. They were bordered by rivers, which, like many other works of Chinese art and philosophy, were patterned after a 3x3 magic square he had been given. This water can be looked at as being 'ch'i-like' — not the *ch'i* of *wei-ch'i* since the characters are much different — but the *ch'i* that is the energy flowing through the countryside of the earth; the *ch'i* that is evident in the 'dragon-lines' of the mountains and the courses of the rivers. An analogy is the *ch'i* that flows through the human body and is blocked or unblocked with the use of acupuncture needles (which are as old as go). Was the go board then a map of China? It certainly would not have been a map of the sky.

The Sky Theory

The Chou wrote their history like this:

Formerly, when King Wu of Chou first attacked . . . the Shang capital of Yin, Jupiter was in Quail Fire; the moon was in Heavenly Quadriga; the Sun was in the Ford that Separates Wood; the New Moon was in the Handle of the Southern Dipper; Mercury was in the Heavenly Turtle; the locations of Mercury, Sun, and New Moon were all in the north-east corner . . . and Jupiter was in the region of the heavens allotted to us, the Chou. (2)

The Han went even further and introduced the cult of T'ien-Ti, the ruling high sky god. Late in the Han (c.150 A.D.), we get the first description of go:

The pieces are yellow and black . . .
they represent the heavenly bodies. (3)

When we look at a go board today, it is easy to think along the lines of the 19th-century Japanese playwright, Chikamatsu, who, since go was probably popularized in Japan during the star-worshiping T'ang Dynasty (c. 700 A.D.), compares the four quarters of the board to the four seasons, the black and white stones to night and day, the 361 (19x19) intersections to the days of the year and the center point to the Pole star. Also, the nine handicap spots are known as 'star points' and appear on the oldest Chinese go boards (which are from

Han tombs). These are often likened to the seven pole stars or the seven planets plus the sun and moon.

There are, however, several minor problems and one major problem with these views. First of all, let's look at the minor problems. The sizes of all the early tomb boards vary, although the first written descriptions mention 17x17. One board was even 18x21. Even in Tibet, where such symbolism could be expected to survive, the standard is 17x17, but no one seems to care if the board is a line or two bigger or smaller. In China, the board was not standardized to 19x19 until around 700 A.D.

Moreover, the most popular early astral theory imagined a heavenly canopy with holes in it to let in the stars' light. The planets and the sun and moon roamed about underneath. This is a bit inconsistent with the pole stars + sun and moon theory, as is the fact that the ancient Chinese could see only five planets and seven pole stars. (It was only after the Han that two extra (invisible) pole stars and a planet were added by mystical Taoists).

But surely, you might say, looking at the modern black and white stones, early man's first thought would be of the stars and constellations. That might be true if he saw our stones, but the earliest stones found in China, dating from the Han, were green and red and not round, but rectangular.

There are even bigger problems with the heavenly theory. The Tibetans name their patterns after animal shapes, and in the formalized verbal 'tongue fights' that sometimes accompany their games, they call their groups various kinds of animals. Why? Because animals have *power*. This is the major problem with the astral theories of go: constellations in Chinese astrology did not 'do' anything. Their location might have marked the seasons, but, as indicated in the Chou quote, it was where the planets and the other roving objects in the sky were moving that was of importance. It was the planets and these other objects that were 'doing the doing', almost as if they were in a chess game. This is the exact opposite of the principles of go, whose Chinese name is *wei-ch'i* — the 'surrounding game'.

Back to Earth — Wind and Water

I think it can be argued much more

coherently that the early players of *wei-ch'i* would have based their patterns and shapes on ideas they had about the land. These ideas eventually were encapsulated in the 'science' of 'wind and water' (*feng shui*), the Chinese form of geomancy.

If you take a stroll in the countryside with a geomancer, he will point out how the *ch'i* is positively coursing all around you — how it is being blocked or attracted, influenced, deflected, trapped or repelled by the various features of the landscape; how you can follow its course by the dragon lines of hills or streams around; how the *sha* (noxious) influences are coming in; how, from an analysis of this data, he can tell if a place has good or bad *feng shui*, that is, if it is a good or bad place in this supernatural sense. This will be the result of various factors, including the direction of the wind and waters, but the most important consideration is the shape of the features that impinge on a site. In every situation there are good and bad shapes. They can be convex or concave, hollow or pointed, open or closed and their relevancy will be different from situation to situation, depending on how they affect the balance of yin and yang. These ideas about yin and yang, two organizing principles that permeate the Chinese universe, go back to the earliest records of Chinese writing, those of the oracle bones of the Shang.

It can be seen how such knowledge would be helpful, both to beginners and early men, in organizing one's play before 'look ahead' powers had developed. The language of go — 'good shape', 'bad shape', 'influence', 'walls', 'solid territory', etc. — takes on additional meaning if these patterns and the reasoning behind them are looked at as geomantically oriented. The thinking here is much more akin to the spirit of the game than are the feeble comparisons with the ineffectual stationary patterns of the stars and the irrelevant (for the purposes of go) movement of the planets.

More than that, I would suggest that the reason that ancient Chinese games started with two white stones and two black stones, a question which has bedeviled go historians for a long time, is that it sets up the *feng shui* for the game.

An empty board, which is the way Japanese began to start their games after the

11th century (and the Chinese only relatively recently), although it makes for a more interesting game, has no *feng shui*. Like the idea of a man without a soul would be to a medieval Christian, it is hard to imagine the eerie feeling that this would engender in the Chinese mind unless you have lived in a place like Hong Kong or Taiwan, where the general feeling is that there are living, active forces in the land, in the shapes and in the colors of all that is around you. (If you doubt the power of *feng shui* in Chinese culture, the next time you play a traditional-minded Chinese, keep a pencil or a pen pointed at him while he is trying to make up his mind where to move and see if there is a reaction.)

Another indication that these anthropomorphic feelings about the go board existed at one time is the holdover in both Japan and China of 'home corners' (the bottom right side) where it is very rude for the opponent to play first. Play is always 'carried' to the opponent first, but on his left side.

It would thus seem that if there was ritual going on about the go board, it would have been ritual concerning *feng shui* and the relations between yin and yang. It would be just as easy to look at the ancient go board not as the sky but as an earth-temple built by humans, at least in our sense of the word, if not in theirs.

A pleasant diversion might be to re-create what the Chinese mind would have thought about the symbolism of the go board c. 200 B.C.

By design or accident, Chinese go boards have always measured almost exactly one square *feng shui* 'foot' (about 17 3/8"), the unit Chinese geomancers use to measure indoor objects. There, in a marked-off area of silence where nothing was accidental and everything was of significance, the yins and yangs of Space and Time would be created and funneled through the ritual of the rules and the game. Those of the yin of Space would include the setting of the lines (yang) and the resulting squares (yin). The material and the shape of this area would be yin — source of the present 'wood' radical for the character for go. The shape of the bowls that held the stones would be yin, as was the shape of the stones, though the material was yang — source of the earliest radical for go. The White priest would be bet-

ter and yang, the Black one would be yin. In the yang of Time, the past of the(ir) game(s) (also yang) would be sucking through the present situation on the board the chaotic yin of the future. From the primal chaos and its mixture of yin and yang in the bowls, the attendants of the temple would select their stones to create various forms, the insides of which would be yin, the outsides yang. These groups would live with what we now call two eyes (yang), although calling them lungs (yin), the source of ch'i in our bodies, might be better. It is more likely, though, that the priests would have thought they were giving these forms two souls, the first one (*hun*) being yin, giving a sort of 'animal' life, and the second one (*p'o*) being yang, conferring immortality on them. This was exactly as, according to their religion, it had happened in the development of their own bodies.

Thus, go would not only be imitating mythic history but also 'life' — or, as go players (and Manfred Eigen, a Nobel Prize-winning microbiologist) are fond of saying, perhaps it was 'vice-versa': '“play” is inherent in the universe'. (4)

II. Go and the Dead

We have looked at some of the reasons why, if the mention of go was not an integral part of the original flood and separation myth already, it may have been interposed at some time by a group whose interests were not in the stars, but on the ground.

From the archaeological point of view, the major problem with this theory would be that the oldest go stones and boards (which are also stone) date only from Han-age tombs (and, incidentally, were not meant to be played on by living people). However, since the literary records indicate that go was played much earlier, perhaps the earliest boards were made of wood or, more likely, cloth (like the almost entirely deteriorated remains of what might be an early *liu-po* dice game board that was found in a Chou tomb). It is also possible that they were simply drawn on the ground, as modern Chinese often do with the 6x6 or 7x7 boards they use for the many games they play with ordinary pebbles. Today, it is recommended that beginners start on a 9x9 board.

This size (and the resulting arrangement of handicap points) is congruent with Shang magic square symbolism, the lines of which are 9x9. There is no reason to believe that the earliest boards were larger. Later, play would have become sophisticated enough to warrant bigger boards, which numerologically would lead to the attendant astral symbolism that was so agreeable to the sky point of view.

From the historical point of view, there is a line of inquiry, developed by Yasunaga Hajime, that follows the idea that go boards were first heavenly calendars imposed on the square earth. He suggests that there was a survival of this practice in Tibet and it is true that Tibetan go places 12 black and white 'starting' stones around the board, which they say signifies, among other things, astrological 'houses'. (The size of their board, 17x17, is irrelevant, although Yasunaga tries to build an historical case out of a combination of this and the use of the duo-decimal system in the northern Yin Dynasty [1384–1112 B.C.]). (5)

It was my experience in playing in Tibet that these 12 stones are primarily regarded as the players' 'bulls' (they are bigger than the rest of the stones), which are defended by the 'dogs' — an earthly paradigm. These stones, and the areas around them, were also looked at as 'representing' the 12 areas of Tibet and the 12 palaces of the square city of Omolungring — the Shangrila of the pre-Buddhist Bon religion. The calendar idea seemed to be only coincidental with the general sacredness of the number '12'. In general, on square game boards throughout the world, as on the *shih* boards in early China, the sides and quadrants primarily symbolize the four directions. As for the practice of putting six stones a side down before beginning, it is hard to imagine that this purely Tibetan practice is anything other than an independent development which greatly simplified the game and made it easier for its provincial players to enjoy. This would have taken place after go was introduced or independently invented there (the practice never appeared in China), adopting itself to their religious iconography. Yasunaga's origins theory is also of course subject to the same problems as those of sky theories in general when it comes to the idea that go is a 'surrounding' game played with individual

stones. The other anomalies of Tibetan go — one must wait a move before killing a group or before playing on territory where a stone has been killed — would seem to stem from the influence of later, benevolent Buddhist thinking.

From the cultural anthropological point of view, the most controversial issue, as mentioned before, is the veracity of the myths. Nevertheless, in the Yao case, most sinologists would probably agree that there is a basic core which is worthwhile examining for structure and patterns, and onto this core we can superimpose the study of games. Games, particularly games that survive a long time, are interesting to anthropologists because, as we have seen, they 'encapsulate', 'represent', 'symbolize', 'are intertwined with' (the reader may choose the epithet) the interests of the cultures that play them. All very old cultures have changed and for a game to survive, the thinking about that game must change, too. Go, for example, has been adopted, for various reasons, by every major religious and power group (including the present regime) in Chinese history.

The Beginning of the Game

In the beginning, before its inclusion in the Yao legend, we can speculate that go was originally only one of many 'pebble games' that the Chinese seem always to have been fond of. (Even today, a casual tour of any Chinese city will reveal at least a half-dozen varieties.) It is hard to imagine that it was 'invented' by anyone — let us say it was 'discovered'.

To illustrate the possibility of this idea, there is the following mystifying passage from the *Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*, referring to the remains of a neolithic settlement on the Bay of Pkhusun in Siberia:

... Most curious in this stratum are small discs cut from soft stone, one side of which is convex, the other flat. What these stone 'checkers' were used for remains a mystery. The settlement is especially interesting because it has been dated by the radio-carbon method and proves to be 4170 ± 60 years old. (6)

Chinese go stones are of this mushroom-

type shape of course, and this site happens to be of the same age that the legend of Yao (and the possible remains of his palace) are dated.

Of course, Siberia and China are a long ways from each other but they do have one connection.

Early mankind needed a bridge to the supernatural, someone to cure his illnesses, and if not tell the future for him, at least tell him what was wrong with the present. The men who fulfilled these needs are generally known by the Siberian term of 'shaman', where their practices lasted into the present century.

In China, during the Shang period, the shaman helped the king and other interested parties read the cracks that would appear after the roasting of the oracle bones and turtle shells. In the later Chou period, there were tremendous changes in society and, as tribal and village orientations widened, so did the activities of the shaman. They became known as *feng-shih*. Many continued to be involved in what we would call medicine, although this had a much broader meaning by then, embracing a dualistic philosophy of science, which later became yin-yang theory. Some lived as hermits, others became attached to courts, treating (and probably killing) many kings with alchemical procedures for becoming immortal. One of their accomplishments was that they could fly. Needham and many others argue that this was done with the aid of magic mushrooms.

Below is the 'oldest' story about go, purportedly taking place at the time of the first of the legendary 'Golden Age' kings (the Chou interposed him ahead of Yao). Although it was written down sometime in the later Han, it is reasonable to assume that it speaks from an earlier period.

Chang was the musician-companion to the Yellow Emperor Huang-ti. One day, assuming insect wings, he became 'Teacher Huang Yai', and flew up to the top of Mt. Chang-an to play go. (7)

This is the story that go-historians point to when they want to claim a shamanistic beginning of go. However, these theories have assumed that divination preceded and caused

the invention of the game, and we saw that this is not necessarily true. In fact, the kind of game go is means that it could only be used for divination after it was a general feature of the society.

To discover why this is so, the nature of divination in the religious systems of these early peoples will be looked at from the point of view of games of strategy. A strategy game, unlike most anthropological data, is created by the combination of the consciousness of two people, and perhaps in that clue can be found additional reasons to believe that it was a pre-Chou, pre-Han game and that, after its pebble stage, its inclusion in the Yao legend is so significant.

The Past and The Future: Divination and Go

One possible reason why, if go was a Shang invention, it had nothing to do with the future was because, for them, the future may not have existed. It is interesting that the thesis of the Bi-Cameral Mind Theory of Julian Jayne fits the Chinese situation so well, although it doesn't discuss it. At that period in man's development, so the theory goes, our brains were split, so when we heard supernatural voices talking to us, it was one hemisphere directing the other, be it in the mind of a king or a peasant. Thus there was no subjective reality and we were not 'conscious', so therefore we had no concept of the future. Then, as the breakdown of bi-camerality occurred, we needed more and more 'interpreters' (shaman) and artifacts (oracle bones) to carry on our dialogue with the supernatural since the gods no longer spoke to us directly. But, whatever you think of this theory (perhaps it is a metaphor), there are yet other problems about go and the future in that period.

In most societies, divination procedures do not even ask about the future. This is because, in traditional religions, there is no 'Sky God' busy making it. The Shang (and presumably other earlier and contemporary tribes of that area) worshiped their ancestors. In the 'insect' story above, both the Yellow Emperor and Haung Yai are considered to be euhemerized versions of the chief of these ancestors, Shang-Ti.

These ancestors were not gods — after they had died, they concerned themselves with the situations that they were familiar with, such as marriages, family disputes, etc. Their time was of the past; they could not control the future. Questions asked of them by the shaman using the oracle bones and turtle shells seemed to be requests or about whether current or proposed action was 'correct behavior' or not. As memory of the more anciently-deceased faded away, they became involved with more abstract things such as the weather, floods, invasions, etc. The ancestors would have had to have already known the game before they could make any sense out of the patterns the shaman are supposed to have been casting.

Another problem with connecting go and the future in the Shang period comes from the dualistic nature of 'philosophy' in early Chinese society. There were two forces in the universe, good and evil, black and white, yin and yang. From Tibet, whose ancient Bon (pre-Buddhist) religion closely resembled that of early China's, comes an old story that neatly illustrates this difficulty.

A boy's father was killed by a man. Naturally, as he was growing up, the boy and his mother wanted to kill this man as soon as possible. At last came a time when the mother thought it might be proper to find out if 'it was time'. She gave her son a go set, and he played a game. His right hand taking White, his left Black, his mother shouting Bon power mantras at crucial points, while perhaps his doppelganger 'guardian-spirit', sitting on his right shoulder, offered timely advice, 'He' (that is, White) 'won'. This indicated that it was a 'good' time. He went out and killed his man. (8)

Were the two of them fortune-telling, looking for an omen, or trying to see the future in our sense of the word? No. They were ascertaining the state of the universe at the time. Was it an evil or a good time? Who, for example, was playing the Black stones? Who was playing the White ones? No one. In fact, *it was the stones that were playing him* — just as a shaman might be 'danced' by powers greater

than him. This was not Muslim-style fatalism — the future had not been decided. The game was taking place in a 'continuous present' — a Black win would only have indicated that it was an evil period from their point of view and that it would have been dangerous to proceed.

This sort of cultural milieu was hardly conducive to two shaman sitting around and arguing about the meaning of patterns on a map of the sky. It is true that in Tibet (until the Cultural Revolution killed all its practitioners), Bon shaman would read go patterns that would be produced in games with their 'clients' and foretell such things as 'when they were going to die'. But here go was already a part of the culture. And the client would have had to know how to play the game.

Strategic Implications

Who was Huang Yai flying off to play with? Fellow magicians? Other ancestors? The intimacy of the gods of the Shang system did not carry over to the Chou, to whom Shang-ti became identified with an impersonal Heaven and was thus separated from the world of ancestors and men. (The Bi-Cameral Theory also notes this change in Middle-Eastern religions when the gods no longer spoke to man.) This was the second Great Division of Chinese Mythology: the split between heaven and the world. After this happened (the ladder to heaven was cut in two, according to one myth) men even began to challenge the gods. By the time of the Han and the institutionalization of their god 'Tien-ti' ('Sky-god'), histories were being rewritten to help consolidate the empire through the promotion of rationalism and Confucian values.

For this reason, many go historians argue that although go was probably invented earlier, it was then written into the Han myth-histories to give it greater antiquity. This is a commonsense view, of course, but it also turns out to be a 'non-sense' view. To counter it we must again discuss games of strategy and religion.

Go is a game of skill and not chance. This difference, in Western culture, is profound because of our single-God theories. It was most apparent in the middle ages. In Muslim-style fatalism, chance was a friend of God (since He

could speak through, for example, the numbers of the cards or dice). In the Christian freedom-to-err, rationalistic style of worship, chance was the Enemy. Thus, Muslims punished chess players since they thought they could outwit God and Fate on their boards, while dice players were approved as accepting His Will. Christians, on the other hand, in general, frowned on dice, since it brought the chaos of the Devil into one's life, but thought chess was good for the development of the rational part of the mind.

The early Chinese attitude, on the other hand, is very different. In regard to the Tibetan boy playing against himself, it obviously didn't matter if he was playing go or dice. The universe was speaking through him. In regard to the future, early dualistic Chinese thought is reflected by the fact that even the gods were addicted to gambling over it (and hence Fate), by playing *liu-po*, a dice game.

Yet, obviously, chance and strategy in China are two different things. There would seem to be much more meaning in the playing of go than the rolling of dice, in a historical context. Since each player is planning and making his own future, does go's appearance in the Yao legend signal a certain jump in the stage of consciousness of man? Along with man's increasing control of his environment, was the control of his mind also being celebrated? Moreover, do we look for some analogy in the story of Danju, who refused to obey his father and thus made his own future? Do we also get an echo of this in the Father figure who is casting his own 'future' aside because as an ancestor, after he dies, he will have no one to look after him and attend to his needs?

To continue along this line of anthropological thinking about games of strategy, there are the 'reverse-Oedipal' aspects of go to consider.

The Yao story is everybody's favorite but there were two other versions of the creation of go in China that appeared in other books. One involved Shun, Yao's successor, and one involved Chiao, who came perhaps 600 years later (around 1750 B.C.). In these versions there are again only brief mentions of go. The latter two kings invented it or had it invented, but it is curious that this was also for the benefit of their wenching and gambling sons, and in

neither case did the cure work. Just as in the Yao legend, both had to pass their kingdoms on to more virtuous friends. Also, there were the same kind of variations (i.e. that the sons were right and the usurpers wrong) that were in the Yao myth, and again, as in the Yao myths, none of these mention go.

In regard to this type of 'analogue story', there has been some work by Sarah Allan and others on the structural analysis of these myths along the lines of Levi-Strauss.⁽⁹⁾ This has revealed patterns of themes, motifs and artifacts that are consistent with the method of the transfer-of-power which was in turn consistent with the philosophies of the writers of the books and fragments of books that have survived. In other words, the structure of these later stories imitates those of the first, thus providing historical examples to back up the ideas of the writer about the nature of government, morals and etc. Thus, we shall focus on the Yao story and not on the Shun or Chiao, which only repeat it since they were written by fellow Confucians of Ssu-Ma Ch'ien.

Scholars have investigated the varieties of these stories, but no one has commented on the relevance of go. Why is it there?

One idea might be that the 'invention' of go was a *leit-motif* in the legend, whose symbolism made it agreeable as a mnemonic device in the oral telling of the tale, like those that appear in the Illiad and Odyssey. Continuing to think along this line might lead one to the conclusion that there is a connection with the thinking behind the old Chinese martial arts adage: 'one must kill one's teacher'.

If it was already in the Yao legend, another possibility is that the Han re-writers were so focused on the pedagogic possibilities of the Yao story that they forgot to take out the tidbit about go.

If it wasn't in the legend originally, then there is the afore-mentioned 'common sense' theory, namely, that the Han wished to make go look older than it was, so they simply added the details. This idea has been endorsed by many go historians. One crucial objection is that this was the wrong place to put it. Confucius and Mencius and their Han followers were against gambling, so why would they think that go would cure this 'character defect'

in someone like Danju? The first thing he would have done with a new game would be to gamble on it.

But these ideas still have not dealt with the question of why it only appears in the 'unvirtuous son' versions and not in the others.

To answer this, we must look at the moral lesson the Confucians were trying to expound. 'Although the study of go is an intriguing mental exercise,' they were saying, 'and it looks like it will take your son's mind off the pursuit of its evil ways, don't be fooled, because it won't.' Thus, there are two possible conclusions. One is that they put it into the Yao legend when it wasn't there already. This is not likely because it would be hard to foist this on readers who would have had some idea of the real legends.

A much more likely answer is that it was deliberately left in the unfilial versions *and taken out of all the other variations*. Why? Because, although they would change their minds later on in Chinese history, not only the Confucians but all the early schools of moral philosophy, to put it simply, thought that go, *because it is a strategy game*, teaches one 'dirty tricks'. Thus, in the other versions, if Danju was right, for example, and Shun was wrong, the knowledge of go would only diminish his 'pure' image.

This type of selective *reportage* becomes only another reason to suspect that go was already in the Yao myth long before the Han re-writer's time. The people who put it in there lived before the separation of Heaven and Earth, and its celebrants, the Chou and the Han. They lived at a time when the ancestors' authority was still absolute and at a point when the idea of a conscious future had just began, when the emerging ability to play a strategy game was still looked on as a significant event. The simplicity of its rules and the focus of its symbolism would qualify it as a sacred game to an 'earth' culture.

The next section will discuss how evidence that go retained its sacred aura and respectability in the new 'star' culture comes, strangely enough, from the very reason that the Confucians and other philosophers of the time were so suspicious of it. Go was associated from the beginning not only with gambling but also with a type of philosophy that

seriously competed with theirs over answers about the true nature of reality.

III. The Dark Way

After the 'Insect' and the Yao stories, what I like to call 'pleasant' or 'nice' histories of Chinese go usually discuss the famous passage from Confucius:

The Master said, 'It is difficult to be full and think about nothing. Are there not liu-po and go players? To be one of these would still be better than doing nothing at all.'

And two pieces from Mencius' writings:

I.

There are five things which are pronounced in the common usage of the age to be unfilial . . . The second is gambling and go-playing and being fond of wine without attending to the nourishment of (your) parents.

II.

Now go-playing is but a small art, but without his whole mind being given, and his will bent to it, a man cannot succeed at it. Go Ch'iu is the best go player in all the kingdom. Suppose that he is teaching two men to play. The one gives to the subject his whole mind and bends to it all his will, doing nothing but listening to Go Ch'iu. The other, though he seems to be listening to him, has his whole mind running on a swan which he thinks is approaching, and wishes to bend his bow, adjust the string to the arrow, and shoot it. Although he is learning along with the other, he does not come up to him. Why? — because his intelligence is not equal? Not so. (10)

Of course, the scholarly wrangles about the exact dates of these passages and who, if not Confucius and Mencius, wrote them, will, as Donald Potter has noted, continue to give hundreds of historians and philologists employment forever. Thus, let us try to look at what is behind them with the attitude of explorers and not with the idea that we will ever find exactitude.

Go and Gambling

Right from the beginning go has been associated with gambling and liu-po, a dice game played on a board. It is still played for money today. Chinese and Koreans won't tell you and you won't see it on the tables but in their clubs, as in many in Japan, most of the games are being played for cash. If you lose, it is the expense of a go education — it's how you pay your teacher. The fact that a third person puts up the wager in professional go does little to change this situation.

It is easy to see why persons like Confucius, Mencius and their modern counterparts who write introductions to go books tend to shy away from this darker side of go. Even so, aside from these classical quotations and one discussed in the footnotes below, there is no mention of go and gambling until after 6-700 A.D., when, surprisingly, a character used for 'gambling' suddenly becomes interchangeable with the character for 'go'. (11) Why is this so when we can assume betting was part and parcel of the game long before then?

Part of the reason is gambling's role in the cultural and spiritual matrix of early China. In the view of modern anthropology, betting on games did not just proceed from divination but developed independently. The course of this development can be explained according to two models. The earliest explanation was that the boards and/or the time of the year games were played are drawn from 'cosmic symbolism' — the shape of the board, the mechanics of play, the passage of critical seasons, etc. Gambling accentuates and provides a more personal participation in what can be called a triumph over the 'spatio-temporal condition'. Betting in traditional societies concerns more than just money, however. What is often being bet is 'pride' or 'status'. This leads one to the second explanation, developed by Geertz in his work in Bali concerning 'deep play'. There, there is a 'consuming passionate involvement drawing on deeply irrational cultural codes . . . where the stakes are so high that participation is irrational . . . and a certain meeting with the demonic occurs'. (12) (Today, psychologists, forgetting its covert religious origins, would call this 'addictive behavior', the 'just one more game syndrome' — fostered by intermittent re-

inforcement', which is far more effective in producing compulsive behavior than if the 'victim' is rewarded by winning everytime.) Thus the game of Liu-po would draw the gods into betting the ultimate status bet, their very immortality.

In classical societies, since actions born of desire not only bind one to this world but draw one to the divine, these explanations are not necessarily exclusive of one another. For example, in India, Shiva and his wife play an on-going game of strip-dice where Shiva usually loses and stomps out. Thus, the action always stops short of their becoming naked, because this event would signal their 'merger' and hence the end of the universe. The continual play is the continual re-creation of the cosmos. In a like vein, Krishna declares in the *Bhagavadgita*, 'I am the dice, I am the game', and Indians bet on dice games during the festival of Diwali in the winter to continue the cycle of the universe.

What is most interesting for us here is a third element that is always present in societies where gambling goes on, whether they are ancient or modern. This is the chorus of 'nay-sayers', the ones who keep things secret (often it is the players themselves) or say either 'this doesn't happen here' or 'it is a dirty and low activity and *we* shouldn't (or don't) do *that* sort of thing'.

The problem for the history of go is that Confucius' and Mencius' writings are taken at face value and their role in this psychological and historical dialectic has not been noticed.

Go and the Classics

It is usually said that Confucius tolerated the two forms of recreation, liu-po and go, but he obviously didn't think much of them, classifying them only slightly above eating and thinking about nothing at all. After this, it is said that Mencius, or whoever was writing for him, was more emphatic about his dislike, classifying go as one of the five sins against being filial. Then, the logic is to say that there is an anomaly in the second quotation from Mencius (the one indicating that go required a great deal of concentration) which, if compared to the attitude of the first, makes us think that it was written in the Han dynasty around 0 A.D., by a different person than the

one who wrote the first. This, it is said, is because only by this relatively late period had go-playing improved to the point where it was becoming a respected art with an aura of wisdom about it.

An initial problem with this view is that the Mencius writer may have been using this second quote as an illustration about teaching and not about learning. That is, he may have wanted his audience, the aristocracy (or more likely their children), to associate the wisdom of listening to him with the wisdom of learning go. It would have been obvious to anyone who had ever picked up a go stone (and was still awake listening to him) that thinking is required — especially if they had money riding on the game.

Moreover, as we shall see, there is a good possibility that the understanding of the game was already quite advanced, and that go already had a considerable aura of wisdom around it, but Confucius and Mencius (or more probably, the people who re-wrote them) would have been unwilling to acknowledge or appreciate this.

Go-Thinking, War-Thinking and Philosophy

Traditionally, sinologists and other interested people have studied three principal 'Ways' or 'Paths' that the Chinese have followed in their various quests through life. One is the path of 'Nature' — the Taoist Way, another is the 'Way of Man' — the Confucian Path, and the third, for lack of a better term and to complete the Earth-Man-Heaven trilogy, is the 'Way of Heaven', i.e. the Buddhist Path (which only appeared in China after the fall of the Han).

Recently, however, archaeological finds of 5th century B.C. manuscripts, previously thought to be forgeries from much later periods, have made historians much more aware of the importance of a Fourth Way — one which they now know intertwined itself with the other three from the very beginnings of Chinese history. This is the Dark Way, the Way of Yin, the Left-Hand Path, 'Gui Dao' — the Path of Deception. The importance of 'Bing Jia' — the School of Strategy — has finally been recognized. (13)

Previous to these discoveries, traditional

Confucian Chinese scholarship of the last thousand years, because it thought that the seven books of the 'Strategic Canon' were not authentic, considered those who studied war in this period not as philosophers but only as professionals who studied war. To them, *wen* (roughly the 'civilian sphere') and *wu* (roughly 'military affairs') were separate entities and their combination, that is, the combination of war and philosophy, was a late development. What we now have is a more balanced picture of 5th and 4th century B.C. affairs when the beginnings of Taoism, Confucianism and Legalism were merging with the ideas of the Strategists.

Of concern to us is the style of strategic thinking (which originally came from very ancient techniques of hunting), whose proverbs sound like go thinking. For example, 'War is always a dialectic — one side cannot win everything — thus war is about making profit' (as opposed to ideas of war and chess in the West as annihilation). 'The Superior side loses inches, the Inferior side gains feet, it is all the same' (in Chinese society, as in handicap go, one is always inferior or superior — the former scheming with greater numbers, the latter dividing and conquering with greater powers). In a more mystical vein is: 'One must adjust to natural changes in the flow of time' and 'All forms can be conquered, but none knows which will do this'. These principles the Strategists shared with early Taoism in writings such as those of the mysterious 'Master of the Devil's Valley' (c. 550 B.C.).

Sunzi, author of the 'Art of War' (c. 500 B.C.), until recently not even thought to be a real person, combined Taoism and Confucianism with ideas that all go players know: 'One should first prepare a counter to the enemies' strategy, then attack his alliances (connections), then his armies (his solid groups), and last of all, his walled cities (his territory).' More important, he said that one should not fight until one has maneuvered oneself into a position of numerical and strategic superiority, since 'ten will defeat one'.

The next figure, Master Wu Qi (c. 400 B.C.), was a Confucian, and so he advanced the argument that with a proper spiritual attitude of 'benevolence', 'justice' and 'proper management' (i.e. in go terms, a lack of greed,

an ability to look at the whole board, a sense of harmony and a knowledge of styles of play) 'one could defeat ten'.

Along with mixtures of these attitudes, the philosophies of the period (it was called, with good reason, the 'Time of the Hundred Schools') also shared the nascent Legalist attitude, which reflected the changes in war from killing for your ancestors to killing for your Prince. Armies and peoples, like go stones, were to be managed as inert objects and manipulated in calculations of maximum benefits for the ruler.

Wen and *wu* were not so separate in other areas of life. For example, it is hard to tell whether some texts were about war or sex (or even go, which, when iconographically presented, meant male and female intercourse). The 'Dark Lady', a mystical apparition whose very gender embodied the source of her knowledge, taught the Yellow Emperor about both battles and love: 'One must spare one's own force while utilizing that of the opponent,' and 'One must begin by yielding in order to catch the enemy unawares thereafter.' In the art of painting, one marshaled one's equipment and resources like a commander preparing for battle, and dealt with the same problems as go players, such as 'emptiness', 'fullness', 'form', 'lack of form', 'might', 'straight action' and 'maneuver'.

In general, while the art of war was yin, the methods used were yang — that is, the strategists gave us a general theory of action. The principles of war expressed or reflected the fundamental patterns of the divine order. Thus on one level, 'the highest art of statecraft is not to be distinguished from the highest art of war.' 'Too many victories,' for example, 'will exhaust the winner.' On another level, Master Zhuang, one of the rediscovered Strategists, wrote about everyday life in terms that anyone who has visited a go club will recognize:

In (human) relations and unions, everyday fighting of the minds is going on, sometimes irresolute, sometimes sly, sometimes secret. While those with little fears are careful and trembly, those with great fears are deliberate. Some bound off like an arrow or crossbow pellet, certain that they are ar-

biters of right and wrong. Others cling to their position as though they had sworn to be in league with it; intending to defend their position until victory.

In Chinese society in general, Confucian values were fine for dealing with one's family affairs and for public display, but when it came to getting what you wanted from superiors, inferiors or strangers, the School of Strategy's methods were used, although of course they weren't discussed.

Conclusions

It is curious that by the 4th century B.C. this type of thinking, unlike Taoism and Confucianism, had more or less fully developed. Later books, like the '36 Strategies' ('Muddy the waters to catch the fish', as, for example, 'White will do in a handicap game; 'The plums die for the peaches', which could be an illustration of enticement in tesujis and the art of sacrifice; 'Kill with a borrowed knife', which could mean, among other things, play on one side to attack the other, etc.) were only baroque embellishments.

These affinities between go, the philosophies and the School of Strategy seem to have been fully developed by the time of the writing of the *Tso-chuan* in the 5th century B.C.:

Ning-su is now dealing with his ruler not so carefully as if he were playing at go. How is it possible for him to escape disaster? If a go-player lifts his stone without a definite object, he will not conquer his opponent; how much more must this be the case when one tries to take a king down without a definite object? He is sure not to escape ruin. Alas that by one movement a family whose Heads have been ministers for nine generations should be extinguished! (14)

One of the reasons that these early connections have not been more obvious was because the writings of the Strategists were kept secret and out of the hands of the general public and scholars, emerging only after the Song Dynasty (c. 1000 A.D.) as the 'Canon of War' and thus, as mentioned before, thought to be late

forgeries. Not only do ordinary Chinese not like to talk about these yin affairs in their lives, but their rulers were not interested in their rivals obtaining information about its methods, since it was thought that possession of the knowledge of strategy could give one extraordinary powers and perhaps rulership of the world. Thus, these teachings were passed on orally from master to disciple, the language used was deliberately mystical and obscure, and they emerged into public view only in popular fables such as the (later) *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, in folk proverbs, and by the playing and, until books appeared in the later Han, the oral study of go — go being part of the education of practically every upper-class and military person.

Thus, all that was left in the surviving historical records of the Han and pre-Han period were the 'nice', mainly Confucian, books, written by writers whose vested interests lay in expounding the 'right way' of thinking. By trying to ignore, or denigrate as non-philosophical, the competing view of reality of The Dark Way and its basis in 'play', they managed to hide one of the great achievements of the early Chinese mind — the recognition of the game-like qualities of war, art and life — something the West has become aware of and begun to study only in the last few decades.

They probably also concealed some great accomplishments on the go boards. After all, it was there, and only there, that this Chinese mind, with its incredible syncretizing and creative impulses, would have been driven to do its utmost, by its deepest passion, gambling.

THE END

'(Yet) it hath not done with me when I have done with it.'

— Bishop Donald B. Orsden, *Fils*

'Thoughts on Chess'

Harleian Miscellany, 8

London, 1810

FOOTNOTES

1. See William G. Boltz, *Kung Kung and the Flood: Reverse Euhemerism in the Yao Tien*, T'oung Pao, Vol LXVII, 3-5 (1981). I was also

inspired by Walen Lai's brilliant cross-cultural writings in the journal *History of Religions*. Since not all sinologists agree on anything and this is the first attempt to combine this type of thinking with the findings of anthropologists and the history of go there is plenty of room for argument. Nearly every paragraph and often every sentence represents an article or a book, but space limitations (and reader interest) have necessarily limited references. I can be contacted c/o Ishi Press for further information.

2. D.W. Pankenir, *Astronomical Dates in Shang and Western Zhou*, Early China, Vol. 7, 1981-2.

3. *Zhongguo Weiqi*, Liu Shan Cheng, ed, Sichuan, 1985 p. 259. This contains most of the early literary references (in Chinese) to go.

4. See M. Eigan and R. Winkler, *The Laws of the Game: How the Principles of Nature Govern Chance*, Harper and Row, 1983.

5. H. Yasunaga, *Jiji Tsushinsha*, Tokyo, 1977. After I wrote this essay, I found that Hajime had proposed a 'field-system' basis for the design of go boards but he placed it in the Warring States period and without any mythological, cultural or historical basis or conclusions.

6. P. 90. Dennis Sinor, the editor, has informed me that both the writer of this section (A. P. Okladnikov) and the translator are dead, there are no footnotes and the original manuscript (in Russian) has vanished.

7. Rendered from W. Pinkard, *The Go Player's Almanac*, Ishi Press, 1992, p. 7. The magic mushroom motif keeps popping up. Here, the insect wings could be identified with the 'gossamer-winged insects' that feed off the Siberian magic mushrooms and figure frequently in shamanistic lore.

8. From 'Symbolism of Black and White in Tibet', Yian Zhen Zhong, *Tibetan Culture Magazine*, 1992. The English rendering is my own.

9. Sarah Allan, *The Heir and the Sage: Dynastic*

Legend in Early China, San Francisco, Chinese Materials Center, 1981.

10. Except for the literal rendering of the first line of Confucius, the translations are those of James Legge and are reproduced in Donald Potter, 'Go in the Classics', *Go World* No. 37, Autumn 1984 ; and No. 42, Winter 1985-6.

11. In the second oldest quote about go, if it is authentic, we find:

Pu Song (or Wu Cao) — an immortal or a 'learned person' of the Warring States Period (c. 700 B.C.) — (played?) (made?) (gambled at?) wei ch'i.

This was written down during the Ming Dynasty (c. 1300 A.D.) by a writer who was quoting an earlier source. The editor of *Zhongguo Weiqi* denies its authenticity because in the books that have survived, Wu Cao is only mentioned as 'making (zuo) liu po'. This does not make much sense. In the Ming quote, we get the 'gambling' character mentioned in the text as part of a two-character phrase. It does not mean 'learned', as it sometimes does, since here it has the 'shell' (money) radical. This is followed by the characters for wei-ch'i. The case for saying or not saying 'Wu Cao gambled at go' would thus seem to rest on a discovery of the original source.

12. 'Gambling' article by A. Hildebeitel in *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, M. Eliade, ed., 1987, Vol. 5, pp. 468-474

13. Some of the text passages, conclusions and all but one of the quotes in the remainder of this essay are drawn from Krzysztof Gawlikowski's pioneering article, *The School of Strategy (bing jia) in the Context of Chinese Civilization in East and West*, Vol. 35, 1985. Interested readers should refer to it if they wish to separate his thinking from mine (which was mainly concerned with adapting his material to the history of go and providing a readable text).

14. James Legge's translation as it appeared in D. Potter, *op. cit.*

Comebacks by Chen and Qian

China's New Title

The New Physical Education Cup, China's oldest newspaper title, has been discontinued after 14 years, but, thanks to the efforts of the Chinese Ki-in, a new title has been founded to fill the gap. The new title is called the Da Guo Shou Tournament, which means something like the National Champion Tournament. *Da guo shou* is a traditional term for a great champion and at one time was conferred on Go Seigen by Taiwan (he refused the more exalted term of *qisheng* — *kisei* in Japanese — which means 'go saint' or 'go sage').

It is not clear what connection this has with the abolition of the New Physical Education Cup, but it is reported that Ma Xiaochun, China's top title holder, disliked the format of the tournament and that he had stopped playing in it for the last three years. We don't know what his objection to it was. It consisted of an eight-member round-robin league, the winner of which met the title-holder in a best-of-five.

The new tournament is a four-round knockout in which 32 players nominated by the Chinese Ki-in compete. The two players who survive will meet in a best-of-three playoff. This will change to the challenger system next year, with a best-of-five title match (presumably the tournament will change to five rounds to select the challenger).

The big news of the first tournament was the successful comeback of Qian Yuping after an absence of close to two years. Qian forfeited the final of the 4th Fujitsu Cup to Cho Chikun in August 1991; according to the Chinese side, he was suffering from headaches.

Since then no more specific description of his malady has emerged, but during 1993 he seems to have made a return to competitive play. At first, his results were bad, but he came good in the National Champion Tournament and has reached the final. Sure enough, his opponent will be Ma, whose excellent results in internal tournaments are

a marked contrast to his lack of success in the international arena. The fourth round was played on 2 June; Qian beat Yu Bin 9-dan and Ma beat Wang Jianhong 8-dan. (Nie lost to Wang in the third round.)

In this article, we would like to present two games, one from the outgoing and one from the incoming tournament. The first, from the 14th New Physical Education Cup, is also related to a comeback.

Chen Zude's Comeback



Chen Zude's comeback actually took place during 1992, and his absence lasted longer. Born in 1944, he made a name for himself in the 60s and 70s, when he was China's number one and, more important, the first postwar Chinese player able to compete with top Japanese professionals on even terms. However, he spent most of the 80s in retirement from tournament play while he battled cancer. During that decade he restricted himself to writing books and to administrative chores, acting as president of the Chinese Go Association and vice-president of the International Go Federation. When the Chinese Ki-in was founded (on 15 March 1993), he was appointed president, which couldn't leave him with much time for study. However, he did well in the 14th

Physical Education Cup league, taking fourth place with a 3-4 score, including an excellent win over Nie Weiping. We would like to present that game. Unfortunately, there is no commentary, but that shouldn't stand in the way of enjoying the game.

Chen v. Nie

White: Chen Zude 9-dan
Black: Nie Weiping 9-dan
 Played in late 1992.




Figure 1 (1-50)




Figure 2 (51-100)

ko: 75, 78, 81, 84; 86: connects (at 62)




Figure 3 (101-150)
 Moves 151 to 248 omitted.

Chen is known for his originality and his dislike of sticking in the professional rut. Here he puts his own flavour on the game very quickly with the unconventional combination of 26 and 28 in Figure 1. He succeeds in cutting off a group to chase.

A very interesting fight follows in Figure 2. We can only assume that the trade in the *ko* fight is more or less even. In Figure 3, the game turns into ordinary endgame, so we have omitted the remaining moves. The result was a half-point win for Chen.

This game certainly shows that Chen, approaching his 50th birthday, is still a formidable competitor. Unfortunately, we don't have any information on how he is doing in other tournaments.

Qian v. Liu

White: Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan
Black: Qian Yuping 9-dan

This game between Qian and Liu is fiercer: from beginning to end it is one long fight. It also starts with an unusual corner variation on the top left, leading to a four-stone sacrifice that White is in no hurry to accept.

In Figure 2, White moves out with what looks like a clever contact play at 60, but he can't be happy about having to give up his three stones after 65.

Judging by his play in this game, Qian's forte seems to be harassing the opponent. By continuously attacking, he gives White no time to stop and draw breath.

Black 41 in Figure 3 is a sharp contact play. With his superiority in *ko* threats, Black is able to force White to give way up to 58.

White 62 is just a way of setting the scene for resigning.

White resigns after Black 175.




Figure 1 (1-50)




Figure 2 (51-100)

97: captures 90
98: blocks above 97




Figure 3 (101-175)

ko: 37, 42, 45, 48, 51



Qian Yuping


Update. This article, as may be apparent from the text, was originally intended for earlier publication. Since it was written, the final of the 1st National Champion Tournament (*Da Guo Shou*) has been held. The first game was played in Hong Kong on 10 October and the second in Hangzhou on 3 November 1993. Ma won both games.

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
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